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The Elephant in the Room: An Empirical 
Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the 
Jurisdictional Context 
 
King Fung Tsang* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
After a series of cases in the 1980s led by World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson1 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of 
California,2 the Supreme Court did not revisit the subject of personal 
jurisdiction extensively until 2011 when it considered specific jurisdiction 
in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro3 and general jurisdiction in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.4  Subsequently in 2014, 
the Supreme Court further discussed the topic in Daimler AG v. Bauman.5  
In particular, while discussing personal jurisdiction in both Goodyear and 
Daimler, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there could be a potential 
argument to acquire jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations by piercing 
the corporate veil.6  However, the Court never discussed the substance of 
this veil piercing in the context of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs either 
forfeited the argument7 or failed to raise the argument in the first place.8  
 
*   Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong; J.D., LL.M., Columbia 
Law School.  The author would like to thank Professors James Feinerman and David Stewart for their 
valuable comments on the early ideas of this paper.  Any errors, however, are mine and mine alone. 
1.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
 2. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 3. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 4. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); see Patrick J. 
Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (“[I]t marked for the first time in almost a quarter of a century 
that the United States Supreme Court engaged in an extended discussion of the minimum contacts 
test.”). 
 5. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 6. Id. at 759 (“Daimler argues, and several Courts of Appeals have held, that a subsidiary’s 
jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as 
to be its alter ego.”); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (“In effect, respondents would have us pierce 
Goodyear corporate veils, at least for jurisdictional purposes.”). 
 7. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (“Neither below nor in their brief in opposition to the petition for 
certiorari did respondents urge disregard of petitioners' discrete status as subsidiaries and treatment of 
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Despite the lack of full development of jurisdictional piercing, lower courts 
have since interpreted Goodyear and Daimler as positive precedents for the 
doctrine.9  This sets the stage for a much-needed exploration of the 
elephant in the room  jurisdictional piercing. 
Jurisdictional piercing is the judicial process under which the separate 
legal existence of a company is disregarded so as to make a shareholder of 
the company subject to the personal jurisdiction of a court that it would not 
otherwise be subject to.  At times, the term “jurisdictional veil-piercing” is 
used instead by courts10 and scholars.11  It is similar to, yet different from, 
piercing the corporate veil as used in a liability context.12  Traditionally, 
piercing the corporate veil is mostly used to make the shareholder liable for 
the debt of the company by asking the court to disregard the limited 
liability created by the incorporation of a company (hereinafter “liability 
piercing”).13  In both liability piercing and jurisdictional piercing, the court 
is asked to disregard the separate legal existence of a company, but the 
former is for the purpose of busting the limit on liability, while the latter is 
to extend the limit of jurisdiction of the court from the company to the 
shareholder.  Thus, “liability is not to be conflated with amenability to suit 
 
all Goodyear entities as a ‘unitary business,’ so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw in the 
subsidiaries as well. Respondents have therefore forfeited this contention, and we do not address it.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 8. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 (“While plaintiffs ultimately persuaded the Ninth Circuit to impute 
MBUSA’s California contacts to Daimler on an agency theory, at no point have they maintained that 
MBUSA is an alter ego of Daimler.”). 
 9. On Goodyear, see e.g., Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. 328 P.3d 1152, 1157 (Nev. 2014) 
(“Subsidiaries’ contacts have been imputed to parent companies only under narrow exceptions to this 
general rule, including ‘alter ego’ theory and, at least in cases of specific jurisdiction, the ‘agency’ 
theory. The alter ego theory allows plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil to impute a subsidiary’s 
contacts to the parent company by showing that the subsidiary and the parent are one and the same.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Beach v. Citigroup Alt. Invs. LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7717(PKC), 2014 WL 
904650, at *10 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (“As with a finding of presence for jurisdictional purposes 
through a corporate parent, a finding of corporate presence through the presence of a parent company to 
find local harm requires an inquiry analogous to piercing the corporate veil.”).  On Daimler, see 
NYKCool A.B. v. Pacific Intern. Servs., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 385, 393 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) (“The Court 
did not express any doubt as to the soundness of an alter ego theory of jurisdiction, which is present 
only in the rather different circumstance in which one person or entity truly dominates another so that 
the two are indistinguishable for practical purposes.”); see also Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova 
Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 10. See, e.g., PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 172 (Tex. 2007). 
 11. See, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1023, 1033 (2004). 
 12. See Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Liability and jurisdiction are 
independent.”).  
 13. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1036, 1036 (1991) (“‘Piercing the corporate veil’ refers to the judicially imposed exception to [limited 
liability] by which courts disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold a shareholder 
responsible for the corporation's action as if it were the shareholder’s own.”). 
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in a particular forum,”14 and either type of piercing could be raised 
independently or with one another.15 
While jurisdictional piercing had never been fully explained by the 
Supreme Court, it was not exactly a novel concept.  As far back as 1925, 
Justice Brandeis declined to disregard the corporate existence of the 
Alabama subsidiary of Cudahy Packing Company, a Maine corporation in 
order to subject the latter to the jurisdiction of North Carolina in Cannon 
Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.16  Framing the issue as to 
whether “the court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant, a foreign 
corporation was not within the state,”17  Justice Brandeis made one of the 
most oft-quoted statements on piercing the corporate veil: “The corporate 
separation, though perhaps merely formal, was real.  It was not pure 
fiction.”18  Despite not using the term jurisdictional piercing nor even 
piercing the corporate veil,19 the Supreme Court clearly analyzed the 
possibility of extending the North Carolina court’s jurisdiction on the 
concept of piercing the corporate veil.  While Cannon is still considered 
valid law,20 it leaves plenty of question marks over its status in the 
contemporary jurisdiction regime.  In particular, it is not clear whether 
Justice Brandeis was deciding the matter on federal or state law.  Although 
he said that the case was not based on an interpretation of the 
Constitution,21 Cannon was decided before Erie Railroad Co. v. 
 
 14. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 15. E.g., Geanacopulos v. Narconon Fresh Start, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1135 (D. Nev. 2014) 
(finding both liability piercing and jurisdictional piercing against out-of-state parent company). 
 16. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925). 
 17. Id. at 336. 
 18. Id. at 337. 
 19. The court below had drawn analogy to liability piercing, though not using that term.  See 
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 F. 169, 176 (W.D.N.C. 1923), aff’d, 267 U.S. 333 (1925) 
(“If the issue I am passing upon were a question of preventing fraud through a corporate fiction or of 
preventing an escape from just liability, the court would have little trouble in holding that there is such 
identity between the two corporations as to enable the court to prevent fraud; but while the courts 
generally have held that they will look through corporate fictions to prevent such fraud or to enforce 
just liability, yet I know of no case where it has been found that a separate legal corporate entity can 
have process served upon it and such process take the place of process on some other separate legal 
corporate entity.”). 
 20. See William A. Voxman, Jurisdiction over a Parent Corporation in its Subsidiary’s State of 
Incorporation, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 337–38 (1992) (“One sign that the Cannon doctrine is still valid 
is that the Supreme Court has never repudiated it despite having had occasion to do so.  In fact, the 
Court may have implicitly recognized the doctrine’s continuing validity in Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine.”).  See also Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal 
Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1986) (noting that Keeton 
“may amount, in fact, to an explicit revival of the Cannon doctrine”). 
 21. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336 (“No question of the constitutional powers of the State, or of the 
federal Government, is directly presented.”). 
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Tompkins,22 thus making it possible for the ruling to be based on federal 
common law.23  In addition, the substantive test declared by Cannon seems 
highly formalistic.  Despite recognizing that the Maine parent corporation 
dominated the Alabama subsidiary “immediately and completely,”24 the 
court upheld the corporate existence of the subsidiary since its existence as 
a distinct corporate entity was “in all respects observed.”25  The confusion 
caused by these questions continues to date, prompting one commentator to 
describe the law on jurisdictional piercing as “in a state of flux.”26 
Through a carefully designed empirical research on cases decided in 
the three full years (2012 to 2014) after the decisions of Goodyear and 
McIntyre, this article surveys the contemporary practices of the courts on 
jurisdictional piercing and attempts to determine the right test that courts 
should apply.  To be more specific, this article will explore the following 
key questions: 
 
1.  In what situations is jurisdictional piercing generally applied? 
 a. What is the relationship between jurisdictional piercing and 
liability piercing? 
 b. What is the relationship between jurisdictional piercing, agency 
and direct jurisdiction? 
2.  How will jurisdictional piercing be applied? 
   a.  Should state law or federal law govern the jurisdictional piercing 
question?  If it were state law, which state’s law? 
   b.  Should the substantive test of jurisdictional piercing be the same 
as that of liability piercing? 
 
Section II sets out the background and importance of jurisdictional 
piercing.  Tracing the history of jurisdictional developments in the United 
States, it highlights the way in which jurisdictional piercing has regained its 
importance and how it is on the verge of opening a new stage of the 
jurisdictional regime.  The methodology of the empirical research will then 
be described in Section III.  Section IV first goes into detail on each of the 
aforementioned questions and applies the findings of the empirical research 
accordingly.  Section V makes recommendations to improve the current 
 
 22. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  See Brillmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, 
at 5 n.26 (“It is well understood since [Erie], that federal courts are not free to reexamine state decisions 
of ‘general common law.’”). 
 23. See 1 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 24.01, 24-4 (2d ed., 
2011–2012) (arguing that Cannon was “exclusively concerned with federal law”). 
 24. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 23-3. 
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law based on the issues displayed in Section IV.  Overall, the article finds 
that subject to certain justifications, the test for jurisdictional piercing 
should generally remain in the domain of state law.  However, each state 
should develop a jurisdictional specific test for the purpose of jurisdictional 
piercing, instead of blindly adopting the liability piercing test. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTIONAL 
PIERCING 
 
Whilst the purpose of this article is not to give a detailed description 
of the historical developments of personal jurisdiction, some background 
information is necessary.  Generally speaking, personal jurisdiction in the 
United States has been developed in four stages with the latest stage still in 
transition beginning with Goodyear and McIntyre. 
 
A.  STAGE 1 – TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
 
In McDonald v. Mabee, it was stated that: “[t]he foundation of 
jurisdiction is physical power.”27  This is based on the fact that political 
power exercised by the courts of a nation in general only goes as far as its 
borders.28  Sovereignty and jurisdiction have always gone hand in hand 
since the start of nations.  In the Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,29 
Justice Story30 stated that the “first and most general maxim” of conflict of 
laws is that “every nation possesses exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction 
within its own territory.”31  Accordingly, early on, people within the 
territory of a state were subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts.32  The 
assumption of personal jurisdiction was effected through the service of 
process to a person within the forum, and this remains a valid exercise of 
jurisdiction to date.33  The prime case illustrating this form of jurisdiction is 
 
 27. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). 
 28. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS  §§ 77–78. 
 29. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN 
REGARDS TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, 
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (1834). 
 30. Justice Story is widely regarded as “the father of the conflict of laws.” See Ernest G. Lorenzen, 
Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws—One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15, 38 
(1935).  
 31. STORY, supra note 29, at 19. 
 32. Id. at 20 (“The sovereign has power and authority over his subjects, and the goods, which they 
possess within his dominions.”). 
 33. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (“Among the most firmly 
established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have 
jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State.”). 
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Pennoyer v. Neff.34 
In that case, Neff tried to recover a piece of land in Oregon from 
Pennoyer.  Relying on a sheriff’s deed made upon the sale of the subjected 
property on execution issued upon a previous default judgment rendered 
against Neff, Pennoyer claimed that he had valid title.35  The issue was thus 
whether the previous default judgment was granted on a valid assumption 
of jurisdiction when process had not been served on Neff within the state of 
Oregon.36  Affirming the key role played by sovereignty mentioned above, 
Justice Field stated that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”37  He went on to 
find for Neff. Pennoyer v. Neff has since been read as requiring the 
presence of the defendant within the state for the assumption of personal 
jurisdiction.38  Another key development in Pennoyer was the inclusion of 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the jurisdictional 
analysis.  It was stated in the judgment that judgments without proper 
jurisdiction violated due process of the law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The same concept of territorial jurisdiction was also reflected in the 
court’s approach in dealing with corporations.  For example, in Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle,39 it was stated that: 
 
A corporation can have no legal existence out of the 
boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists 
only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and 
where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, 
the corporation can have no existence.  It must dwell in the 
place of its creation; and cannot migrate to another 
sovereignty.40 
 




 34. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 35. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 715. 
 36. Id. at 721. 
 37. Id. at 722. 
 38. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Historically the 
jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the 
defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its 
rendition of a judgment personally binding him.”).  See also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter WRIGHT]. 
 39. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839). 
 40. Id. at 588. 
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This form of jurisdiction as elaborated in Pennoyer and Bank of 
Augusta made sense when there was little travel across state borders and 
business was mostly confined within the state.  However, the economy 
developed, and it was soon found to be insufficient. 
 
1. Stage 1(a) – Presence and Consent 
 
The rather simple basis of jurisdiction faced enormous challenges 
during the Industrial Revolution.41  Gone was the simple world where 
businesses tended to stay within the borders of a state from manufacture to 
distribution to consumption.  Instead, business activities frequently 
extended across state borders, creating a need for the court to assume 
jurisdiction over out-of-state persons.42  Although not welcomed at first, the 
increase in national business activities was accompanied by the rise of 
limited liability companies.43  Unlike natural persons, legal persons are 
capable of doing business in multiple states at the same time.44  This 
presented a serious challenge to the territorial regime.  Instead of asking 
plaintiffs to travel to the home state of defendants for the lawsuits, it 
became necessary for courts to develop certain ways to assume jurisdiction 
over these out-of-state defendants.45 
Two transitional concepts slowly developed to fill this gap–presence 
and consent.  In connection with presence, a corporation is subject to, other 
than its state of incorporation, the jurisdiction of a state if “it is doing 
business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant 
the inference that it is present there.”46  In addition, states also started to 
require out-of-state corporations doing business in-state to appoint service 
agents to receive process.47  This constitutes consent of the out-of-state 
corporations to be subject to the jurisdiction.48 
 
 41. Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 588. 
 42. See generally  WRIGHT, supra note 38, at § 1065. 
 43. See Dante Figueroa, Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States 
and Latin America, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 683, 703 (2012) (“Limited liability statutes were not initially 
enacted across the United States, because many jurisdictions imposed shareholder liability in a number 
of areas of law for various causes of action.”). 
 44. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (“Since the corporate personality is a fiction, 
although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual 
its ‘presence’ without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities 
carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it.”) (internal citation omitted).  See also 
WRIGHT, supra note 38, § 1066. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin,  243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917). 
 47. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (2008) (“Many 
states require foreign corporations, as a condition for doing business in the forum state to appoint a 
local agent for the receipt of service of process.”). 
 48. Id. 
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Finally, one more possibility is piercing the corporate veil.  However, 
the occasions when such a doctrine was applicable as well as the 
substantive test were all very uncertain from the beginning.  The most 
important case at the time was of course Cannon.  As described above, the 
Supreme Court refused to pierce the corporate veil of the out-of-state 
Maine parent due to the proper maintenance of corporate formalities 
between the Alabama subsidiary and the Maine parent.  In fact, Cannon 
shows how consent and presence worked together in this transitional era.  
First, the Alabama subsidiary was subject to the jurisdiction of North 
Carolina because it did business there and had appointed an agent to 
receive service of process.49  This is apparently an illustration of consent.  
Secondly, if the corporate formalities were not observed, it would then be 
possible for the court to hold the Maine parent subject to the jurisdiction of 
North Carolina, thus establishing “presence” of the Maine parent in North 
Carolina.50 
Eventually, however, the stop gap measures of presence and consent 
proved insufficient.  Presence was criticized for its lack of substance.  In 
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.,51 Justice Learned Hand summarized 
such criticism succinctly: 
 
It scarcely advances the argument to say that a corporation 
must be “present” in the foreign state, if we define that word 
as demanding such dealings as will subject it to jurisdiction, 
for then it does no more than put the question to be 
answered.  Indeed, it is doubtful whether it helps much in 
any event. It is difficult, to us it seems impossible, to impute 
the idea of locality to a corporation, except by virtue of those 
acts which realize its purpose.  When we say, therefore, that 
a corporation may be sued only where it is “present” we 
understand that the word is used, not literally, but as 
shorthand for something else.52 
 
 49. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 F. 169, 174 (W.D.N.C. 1923) (“[Record] 
showed that the Cudahy Packing Company of Alabama did business in the states of Alabama, Florida, 
Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee.  Frank H. Ross, care the Cudahy 
Packing Company of Alabama, Charlotte, N.C., was the officer or agent in charge of its business in the 
state of North Carolina, and upon whom process against the corporation may be served.”). Note, 
however, that the Alabama subsidiary was not a defendant in the case. 
 50. Throughout Cannon, the Supreme Court has been framing the issue as one of presence.  See 
Cannon, 267 U.S. at 334–35 (“The main question for decision is whether, at the time of the service of 
process, defendant was doing business within the state in such a manner and to such an extent as to 
warrant the inference that it was present there.”). 
 51. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 52. Id. at 141. 
   
Winter 2016 PCV IN JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT  193 
 
Similarly, the doctrine of consent was criticized by Justice Hand in 
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Co.53: 
 
When it is said that a foreign corporation will be taken to 
have consented to the appointment of an agent to accept 
service, the court does not mean that as a fact it has 
consented at all, because the corporation does not in fact 
consent; but the court, for purposes of justice treats it as if it 
had. . . .  The court, in the interests of justice, imputes results 
to the voluntary act of doing business within the foreign 
state, quite independently of any intent.54 
 
These all set the stage for the era of minimum contacts in Stage 2. 
 
B.  STAGE 2 – MINIMUM CONTACT 
 
Whilst the doctrines of presence and consent helped alleviate the 
problems by extending the traditional territorial basis of jurisdiction, they 
were too artificial to truly address problems caused by the increasing inter-
state activities.  This can be illustrated by the facts of International Shoe 
Co. v. State of Washington.55 
International Shoe was a company based in Delaware.  For years, it 
had sold shoes in Washington through a team of Washington-based 
salesmen in order to solicit business there.56  Instead of setting up a branch 
at a fixed location in Washington, the salesmen were given “a line of 
samples . . . which they display[ed] to prospective purchasers.  On occasion 
they rent permanent sample rooms, for exhibiting samples, in business 
buildings, or rented rooms in hotels or business buildings temporarily for 
that purpose.”57  In addition, they had no authority to accept orders. All the 
orders they solicited were to be transmitted to International Shoe’s office at 
St. Louis for approval.58  The business operations of International Shoe in 
Washington were organized in such a way only because this meant it could 
not be considered to have a presence in Washington under the precedents at 
the time, thus hoping to avoid being sucked into the jurisdiction of the state 
 
 53. Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
 54. Smolik, 222 F. at 151. 
 55. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310. 
 56. Id. at 313. 
 57. Id. at 313–314. 
 58. Id. at 314. 
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of Washington.59  When the state of Washington sued International Shoe 
for unpaid taxes, this fact was expected to be its strongest defense. 
When the case went to the Supreme Court, the Court saw the case as 
an opportunity to reinvent the jurisdictional regime by introducing a more 
common sense approach of minimum contacts.  Instead of changing or 
adding to the presence doctrine, Justice Black proclaimed that a person was 
subject to the jurisdiction of a court as long as he had “certain minimum 
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”60  Applying 
this new minimum contacts doctrine to International Shoe Co., the court 
found the company’s business activities in the state of Washington to have 
been systematic and continuous and, therefore, had no difficulty finding 
minimum contacts.61 
Since International Shoe, we have entered into the era of minimum 
contacts.  All the efforts of subsequent courts have been directed towards 
interpreting and refining what “minimum contacts” mean and whether the 
conduct of a person fits into that definition.  Notably, there have been two 
important interpretations, namely purposeful availment; and the distinction 
between specific and general jurisdiction.  First, the Supreme Court found 
that “the constitutional touchstone remains whether [or not] the defendant 
purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum state.”62  Then 
the court asks “whether the defendant purposefully avails himself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws.”63  With this, the court has injected a 
mental aspect to the test. 
Second, the Supreme Court further subdivides personal jurisdiction 
into two categories: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.  These 
two categories of personal jurisdiction are based on the reading of 
International Shoe64 and adopted by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall.65  Specific jurisdiction stands for the kind 
of personal jurisdiction that “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s 
 
 59. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315 (“Appellant also insists that its activities within the state 
were not sufficient to manifest its ‘presence’ there and that in its absence the state courts were without 
jurisdiction . . . .  It refers to those cases in which it was said that the mere solicitation of orders for the 
purchase of goods within a state, to be accepted without the state and filled by shipment of the 
purchased goods interstate, does not render the corporation seller amenable to suit within the state.”). 
 60. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 61. Id. at 320. 
 62. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 747 (1985). 
 63. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 64. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–64 (1966). 
 65. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  
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contacts with the forum.”66  At the other end of the spectrum, general 
jurisdiction covers the situation where the suit does not “aris[e] out of or 
relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum”67 yet the “continuous 
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature 
as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities.”68 
Overall, the minimum contacts era firmly establishes the long arm 
jurisdiction of the courts beyond territorial jurisdiction.  Specific and 
general jurisdictions further set up the spectrum of the types of activities 
that constitute minimum contacts, be it a one-off act directly related to the 
suit in question or substantial activities in the forum that are unrelated to 
the claim.  It must also be noted that the minimum contacts test only serves 
as the outer limit to the state’s long arm jurisdiction.69  States can set out 
the extent of the long arm jurisdiction they wish to exercise by way of their 
respective long arm statute as long as it is within the constitutional limit.70  
For example, Ohio does not allow the assumption of general jurisdiction as 
none of the prongs under the Ohio’s long arm statute allows for such a type 
of jurisdiction.71  On the other hand, most states have extended their 
jurisdiction under long arm statutes to the maximum limit allowed under 
minimum contacts.72  For these states, the two prongs of jurisdiction 
analysis (minimum contacts and state long-arm statute) have merged into 
one and they simply need to apply the minimum contacts test.73 
Finally, it must be noted that International Shoe did not refer to 
Cannon nor jurisdictional piercing in general.  However, as far as the 
particular facts in Cannon are concerned, jurisdictional piercing is no 
longer required under the minimum contacts test.  In Cannon, the contract 
which was the subject of complaint was entered into by a Maine parent 
instead of the Alabama subsidiary.74  Considering that the dispute arose 
 
 66. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 466 U.S. at 414. 
 67. Id. 
 68. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 69. See Le Bleu Corp. v. Standard Capital Grp., Inc., 11 F. App’x 377, 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (North 
Carolina's long-arm statute “has been interpreted to extend to the outer limits allowed by the Due 
Process Clause.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 717 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Ohio law does not appear to recognize 
general jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, but instead requires that the court find specific 
jurisdiction under one of the bases of jurisdiction listed in Ohio’s long-arm statute.”). 
 72. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 23–29 n.22.  
 73. See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (“As Virginia’s 
general long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by due process, the 
statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry.”). 
 74. See Cannon, 292 F. at 170 (“The transactions out of which the alleged breach of contract in the 
present case grew had no relation to any activity of the Alabama corporation. The alleged contract was 
made solely with the packing company, the Maine Corporation . . . and the Alabama Corporation, as 
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directly from a contract between the Maine parent corporation and the 
North Carolina plaintiff, the suit should fall squarely within the specific 
jurisdiction of the North Carolina court.  However, what if the Maine 
parent learned from the case and ring-fenced its jurisdictional exposure by 
having the Alabama subsidiary enter into the transaction with the North 
Carolina plaintiff?  Will the court still have jurisdiction over the Maine 
parent?  The chess match between the court and the big corporations 
continues in this latest stage of the jurisdictional development. 
 
1.  Stage 2(a) – Jurisdictional Piercing 
 
Minimum contacts appear to solve a large part of the problem that 
arises from out-of-state companies doing in-state business.  However, the 
outer limit of minimum contacts continues to be a matter of huge 
controversy.  For specific jurisdiction, the biggest problem is what is 
known as the “stream of commerce.”75  This metaphor represents “an 
extensive chain of distribution” that the product has been through before 
reaching the ultimate consumer in product liability cases.76  If the out-of-
state defendant simply sold its products through this stream of commerce 
through which it would be reasonably foreseeable to land in the hands of 
the ultimate users in the forum, will that constitute a basis for the 
assumption of specific jurisdiction by the forum court?  In Asahi Metal 
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,77 the Supreme Court was split 
on that question.  Four justices led by Justice O’Connor opined that “the 
placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more,”78 
would not be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction.  There must be 
additional conducts by the defendant that indicate “an intent or purpose to 
serve the market in the forum State.”79  These include “designing the 
product . . ., advertising . . ., establishing channels for providing regular 
advice to customers . . ., or marketing the product through a distributor who 
has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”80  This is known 
as the “stream of commerce plus” approach.81  On the other hand, four 
 
such, is in no way concerned with the merits of the controversy.”). 
 75. This term was mentioned by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980) (“The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process 
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of 
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”). 
 76. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2854–55 (2011). 
 77. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102. 
 78. Id. at 112. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 2d 819, 844 (E.D. 
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other justices led by Justice Brennan were of the opinion that the awareness 
of the defendant of the distribution system along with economic benefits 
that resulted from the sale would be sufficient for the finding of minimum 
contacts.82  The court ultimately agreed to dismiss the case for failing to 
comply with the reasonableness prong of International Shoe.  By the time 
of the trial, the original U.S. plaintiff had already settled with the 
Taiwanese manufacturer, and the only issue remained in the lawsuit was 
between the Taiwanese manufacturer and the Japanese component 
manufacturer.83  All the justices thus concurred that the assumption of 
jurisdiction in such a case would not be consistent with the “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”84 
For general jurisdiction, the exact situations in which it would be 
triggered were still unclear due to a lack of precedents by the Supreme 
Court.  Although the distinction between specific and general jurisdictions 
was clearly adopted by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros, the plaintiff in 
Helicopteros failed to find general jurisdiction.85  The lone case recognized 
by the Supreme Court as an example of the exercise of general jurisdiction 
was Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.86  However, the case is rather 
dated and was decided before the formal adoption of general jurisdiction in 
Helicopteros. 
As a result, on June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court took the opportunity 
to address these problems of specific and general jurisdictions in two 
separate cases. First, the stream of commerce issue was discussed in 
McIntyre.87  In that case, a worker was injured in New Jersey whilst 
operating an allegedly defective machine manufactured by McIntyre UK, a 
company incorporated and with its principle place of business in the UK.  
The issue was whether the New Jersey court could exercise specific 
jurisdiction over McIntyre UK, a company which did not have a branch nor 
did business directly in New Jersey.88  In fact, all transactions, including the 
 
La. 2012). 
 82. See id. at 845 (“although [the Japanese manufacturer] did not design or control the system of 
distribution that carried its valve assemblies into [the forum], the [manufacturer] was aware of the 
distribution system’s operation, and it knew that it would benefit economically from the sale in [the 
forum] of products incorporating its components”). 
 83. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.  
 84. Id. at 121. 
 85. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (finding that 
helicopter purchases and purchase-linked activity in Texas were insufficient for the assumption of the 
general jurisdiction against the defendant in Texas). 
 86. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (finding jurisdiction over a 
Philippine corporation that managed its businesses in Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the 
Philippine). 
 87. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2780.  
 88. Id. at 2786. 
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transaction that brought the machine to New Jersey, were conducted 
through a separate agent based in Ohio. This Ohio agent was authorized by 
McIntyre America (hereinafter “McIntyre USA”) and served as the 
exclusive U.S. distributor of McIntyre UK.89  Other than the sale through 
McIntyre USA, the only relevant contacts of McIntyre UK consisted of (1) 
the official of McIntyre UK participating in certain trade exhibitions in Las 
Vegas, and (2) four machines manufactured by McIntyre UK ending up in 
New Jersey.  Using the stream of commerce metaphor, will the placement 
of the McIntyre machines through the distribution by McIntyre USA in 
Ohio and eventually reaching the ultimate user in New Jersey provide the 
New Jersey court with specific jurisdiction? 
Despite the intention to solve the “decades-old questions left open in 
Asahi,”90 the Supreme Court once again failed to come to a consensus on 
the issue.  Four justices led by Justice Kennedy held firm to the stream of 
commerce plus approach and rejected foreseeability on its own as a way of 
satisfying the purposeful availment requirement for minimum contacts.91  
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg, in a strong dissenting opinion joined 
by two other justices, criticized the plurality on a number of points, 
including the plurality’s reliance on outdated doctrines of sovereignty and 
implied consent.92  Of particular interest in the discussion of this article, she 
found minimum contacts against McIntyre UK by highlighting, inter alia, 
the role of McIntyre USA in McIntyre UK’s plan to penetrate the U.S. 
market.93  However, specific jurisdiction was in the end denied since the 
remaining two justices in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion simply 
thought the assumption of jurisdiction would be inconsistent to established 
precedents but did not agree with the plurality’s reasoning.94  Since the 
justices failed to reach a majority judgment on stream of commerce, we are 
left in the exact same position as prior to McIntyre.  Lower courts that 
previously adopted the stream of commerce approach have continued to do 
so after McIntyre.95 
 
 89. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2796. 
 90. Id.  at 2785.  
 91. See id. at 2788 (“as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that 
its goods will reach the forum State”). 
 92. See id. at 2794–2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 93. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2796–2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 94. See id. at 2794 (“I again reiterate that I would adhere strictly to our precedents and the limited 
facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  And on those grounds, I do not think we can find 
jurisdiction in this case.  Accordingly, though I agree with the plurality as to the outcome of this case, I 
concur only in the judgment of that opinion and not its reasoning.”).  
 95. See, e.g., Chinese Mfg. Drywall Prods., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (“The Fifth Circuit has 
unequivocally declared its adherence to Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Asahi and the stream-of-
commerce doctrine originated in World–Wide Volkswagen  . . . .  Thus, the Court must reject the 
‘stream-of-commerce-plus’ approach to specific personal jurisdiction in favor of the less stringent 
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As for general jurisdiction, its application was put to the test in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.96  In this case, two boys 
were killed in a traffic accident outside Paris, France.  Their parents 
initiated an action in North Carolina against the subsidiaries of Goodyear in 
Europe, alleging negligence in the manufacture of defective tires that 
caused the injury.97  In contrast with the case in McIntyre, the action and 
injury complained of in Goodyear had all happened in France98 and there 
was clearly no application of specific jurisdiction.99  Instead, the plaintiff 
argued that the defendants should be subject to the general jurisdiction of 
the North Carolina court for placing their products in the stream of 
commerce to North Carolina.100  The Supreme Court rejected this argument 
as stream of commerce is confined to specific jurisdiction analysis.101  It 
also took the opportunity to restate the general jurisdiction doctrine.  Most 
notably, the Court tried to confine the applicability of general jurisdiction 
to the “home” of the defendant: “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum 
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a 
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly 
regarded as at home [such as] place of incorporation, and principal place of 
business.”102 
The most significant point of the judgment for our purpose, however, 
is the brief discussion of piercing the corporate veil as a potential 
alternative to acquiring jurisdiction.  As an alternative to the failed general 
jurisdiction argument, the plaintiff sought to “pierce the corporate veil of 
the European subsidiaries to impute the contacts of Goodyear to such 
subsidiaries.”103  Unfortunately, the court regarded the plaintiff as having 
forfeited the argument and did not discuss the viability nor substantive test 
 
‘stream-of-commerce’ approach.”) (citations omitted).  
 96. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2846. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 2852 (“They have no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina. 
They do not design, manufacture, or advertise their products in North Carolina. And they do not solicit 
business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship tires to North Carolina customers.” The only direct 
connection is “a small percentage of their tires . . . were distributed in North Carolina by other 
Goodyear USA affiliates.”). 
 99. Id. (“Acknowledging that the claims neither “related to, nor . . . ar[o]se from, [petitioners’] 
contacts with North Carolina,” the Court of Appeals confined its analysis to “general rather than 
specific jurisdiction.”). 
 100. Id. at 2854–55. 
 101. Id. at 2855 (“Flow of a manufacturer’s products into the forum, we have explained, may 
bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction. . . .  But ties serving to bolster the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has general 
jurisdiction over a defendant.”).  
 102. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2847. 
 103. Id. at 2857. 
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of the jurisdictional piercing.104  The court, however, did not reject piercing 
the corporate veil as a way that could potentially grant jurisdiction to the 
forum. 
Both Goodyear and McIntyre indicate the new problem the courts face 
with corporate groups.  It is true that the long arm jurisdiction established 
under International Shoe allowed the courts to extend their jurisdiction 
upstream to reach the out-of-state corporations, which either have directly 
committed the conduct being complained about (specific jurisdiction), or 
have directly conducted such a high volume of activities in the forum that 
the relatedness thereof does not matter (general jurisdiction).  However, the 
out-of-state manufacturers could simply cut off the reach of the court by 
setting up a separate subsidiary or agent downstream to handle its affairs in 
the forum, such as the distribution of the goods.  Using the stream of 
commerce metaphor, setting up subsidiaries essentially builds a dam and 
blocks the courts from tracing upstream.  Whilst the deadlock in the stream 
of commerce continues post-McIntyre, companies are encouraged to utilize 
sophisticated corporate structures to avoid jurisdictional exposure. 
By the same token, suing parent companies at their upstream “home” 
is equally difficult.  As Goodyear has shown even though Goodyear is 
subject to general jurisdiction at its place of incorporation and principal 
place of business, these fora are not considered as home for its out-of-state 
subsidiaries.  Whilst it is argued that the value of general jurisdiction is to 
ensure that there will always be at least one forum in which a plaintiff can 
sue,105 such alleged value can be substantially dissipated by simply having 
the subsidiaries do the “dirty work” out of state. 
In short, setting up intermediaries that are corporate could effectively 
stop the plaintiff from pursuing the corporate parent either from the place 
of act/injury through specific jurisdiction or from the place of 
incorporation/principal place of business through general jurisdiction.  
Thus, in the next Supreme Court case on jurisdiction, that of Daimler AG v. 
Bauman,106 there was a bold attempt by the plaintiff to sidestep the 
corporate structure through the use of the agency doctrine. 
In Daimler, a number of Argentinians filed suits in California against 
Daimler AG, a German company, for its violation of human rights in 
Argentina during Argentina’s “Dirty War.”107  They claimed that California 
had general jurisdiction over Daimler AG in two ways.  First, there was 
direct general jurisdiction over Daimler AG.108  Second, there was 
 
 104. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2857. 
 105. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 665–66 (1988). 
 106. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746.  
 107. Id. at 751. 
 108. Id.  (“Plaintiffs invoked the court’s general or all-purpose jurisdiction.  California, they urge, is 
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jurisdiction under an agency theory. The jurisdictional contacts of 
MBUSA, the subsidiary of Daimler AG in the United States with extensive 
operations in California, are to be imputed to Daimler AG since MBUSA 
has served as its agent in California.109  Both arguments failed.  As for the 
direct general jurisdiction based on Daimler AG’s own contacts with 
California, this failed in the lower court.110  Thus, the focus of the case was 
on the agency prong.  Under the test approved by the Ninth Circuit, the 
court should ask whether the subsidiary “performs services that are 
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a 
representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would 
undertake to perform substantially similar services.”111  This was 
considered by the Supreme Court to be too broad. If such a test were to be 
adopted, “[a]nything a corporation does through an independent contractor, 
subsidiary, or distributor is presumably something that the corporation 
would do ‘by other means’ if the independent contractor, subsidiary, or 
distributor did not exist.”112 
Further, Justice Ginsburg was of the opinion that even if there was 
found to be agency between MBUSA and Daimler AG, California still 
could not be regarded as “home” to Daimler AG.113  Elaborating on the 
“home” concept that she developed in Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg further 
narrowed down the potential home that one can make of a corporation.  She 
emphasized that a home could not be found whenever “a foreign 
corporation’s in forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous 
and systematic’”114 but that it must be “‘continuous and systematic’ as to 
render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”115  Accordingly, general 
jurisdiction does not apply because California is not the state of 
incorporation nor the principal place of business for either MBUSA or 
Daimler.  It appears that being a large market for one’s products and having 
substantial profits are not sufficient to satisfy the restated general 
jurisdiction test of Justice Ginsburg.116 
 
a place where Daimler may be sued on any and all claims against it, wherever in the world the claims 
may arise.”). 
 109. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752 (“Alternatively, plaintiffs maintained that jurisdiction over Daimler 
could be founded on the California contacts of MBUSA, a distinct corporate entity that, according to 
plaintiffs, should be treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes.”).  
 110. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752 (“Daimler’s own affiliations with California, the court first 
determined, were insufficient to support the exercise of all-purpose jurisdiction over the corporation.”). 
 111. Id. at 759. 
 112. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 759. 
 113. Id. 759–60. 
 114. Id. at 761. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 766–67 (“MBUSA’s California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler's worldwide sales . . . 
in 2004, which . . . is $4.6 billion.”). 
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Finally, on jurisdictional piercing, Justice Ginsburg recognized that 
“several Courts of Appeals have held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional 
contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated 
by the latter as to be its alter ego.”117  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s 
aforementioned agency test was “less rigorous” than the jurisdictional 
piercing test.  Unfortunately, since the jurisdictional piercing was never 
raised in the proceedings, the Supreme Court again failed to make an 
authoritative statement on the viability and substance of the doctrine.118  
However, with the Supreme Court rejecting agency119 as the alternative 
avenue in acquiring jurisdiction, the confusing status of stream of 
commerce, and with Daimler further narrowing the possible home 
available for general jurisdiction, jurisdictional piercing appears to be the 
best hope for expanding the existing jurisdictional reach under due process. 
Some lower courts have interpreted the treatment of jurisdictional 
piercing under Goodyear and Daimler and have regarded both cases as 
positive precedents for the doctrine.  In Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. 
Ct.,120 whilst acknowledging that Goodyear did not openly approve 
jurisdictional piercing, the court was of the opinion that Goodyear had 
“impl[ied],” but not “decid[ed],” that an alter ego theory would be 
appropriate in such a situation.121  After Daimler was decided, the same 
optimism was expressed in NYKCool A.B. v. Pacific Intern. Services, Inc.122  
The court in that case stressed that alter ego, unlike agency, is the 
appropriate theory in obtaining jurisdiction: “[t]he Court did not express 
any doubt as to the soundness of an alter ego theory of jurisdiction, which 
is present only in the rather different circumstance in which one person or 
entity truly dominates another so that the two are indistinguishable for 
practical purposes.”123 
On the other hand, other courts took a more neutral stance and simply 
regarded the new round of Supreme Court cases as not adding any 
substance to the doctrine.  For example, in In re Chinese Manufactured 
Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig.,124 it was stated that “in the recent Supreme 
Court cases addressing personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants the 
Court either declined to address the imputation of minimum contacts 
between affiliated corporate entities, the issue was not before the Court [in] 
 
 117. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 759. 
 118. Id. at 758. 
 119. At least as far as the version previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit. 
 120. Viega GmbH, 328 P.3d at 1152. 
 121. Id. at 1157. 
 122. NYKCool A.B. v. Pacific Intern. Services, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 385. 
 123. Id. at 393. 
 124. Chinese Mfg. Drywall Prods., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 819. 
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Goodyear.”125 
While the law is not clear at this stage, the potential of jurisdictional 
piercing may be illustrated by the three cases above.  First, for general 
jurisdiction, by disregarding the subsidiary’s corporate existence, 
jurisdictional contacts might be attributed upstream from the subsidiary 
(MBUSA) to the parent (Daimler AG) or downstream from the parent 
(Goodyear) to the subsidiary (European subsidiaries).  The upstream 
attribution will not have the aforementioned issue of agency where the 
agent’s home is not significant enough to be the principal’s home.126  This 
is because jurisdictional piercing will make the parent and subsidiary one 
entity for the purpose of general jurisdiction.  The home of the subsidiary 
will automatically be the home of the parent.  For downstream attribution, 
jurisdictional piercing also avoids the issue of whether the jurisdictional 
contacts of the principal could be imputed to the agent.127  In the 
terminology of liability piercing, this upstream attribution is regarded as 
reverse piercing.128 
Second, for specific jurisdiction, although the court did not even 
mention piercing as a possible alternative in McIntyre, we can still see the 
potential application of piercing the corporate veil in that very case. 
Although McIntyre USA was not even a subsidiary and shareholding is 
usually present in piercing the corporate veil, the majority of states allow 
for piercing the corporate veil over unrelated companies, at least as far as 
liability piercing is concerned.129  For these jurisdictions, shareholding is all 
but one factor of the piercing question, the lack of which is not fatal to the 
claim.130  New Jersey, the forum of the McIntyre case, happens to be one of 
these jurisdictions.131  Thus, if the control exercised by McIntyre UK over 
 
 125. Chinese Mfg. Drywall Prods., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (citation omitted). 
 126. See supra notes 114–115. 
 127. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, at 19 (“it is more plausible to impute the contacts of 
the agent to the principal than vice versa.  Agents act on behalf of their principals, to whom their 
activities are attributed. . . .  Normally, . . . control is asymmetric, so that it will be easier to show 
jurisdiction over the principal based upon the agent’s actions than the converse.”). 
 128. Admittedly, reverse piercing is not accepted in all states in liability piercing contexts.  It is 
noted, however, that the Supreme Court at least did not reject outright reverse piercing for jurisdictional 
purposes.  Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2846. 
 129. See Buckley v. Abuzir, 8 N.E. 3d 1166, 1172, 1176–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (“[O]ur research 
shows that the majority of jurisdictions addressing this question allow veil-piercing against 
nonshareholders . . . .  In short, the weight of authority supports the conclusion that lack of shareholder 
status — and, indeed, lack of status as an officer, director, or employee — does not preclude veil-
piercing. Illinois falls in line with the majority.”). 
 130. See Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 412 (Conn. 1982) 
(“[S]tock ownership, while important, is not a prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil but is merely 
one factor to be considered in evaluating the entire situation.”). 
 131. See Hettinger v. Kleinman, 733 F. Supp. 2d 421, 439 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (finding that 
nonshareholder status is not dispositive under New Jersey law). 
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McIntyre USA was so extensive, there was a chance the two companies 
could be regarded as one for the purpose of jurisdiction. 
Looking closer at the lower court’s judgment, it seems that there was 
substantial control applied by McIntyre UK over McIntyre USA: 
 
[The correspondence between McIntyre UK and McIntyre 
USA] support the reasonable inference that defendant 
retained a significant measure of control over the level of 
McIntyre America’s inventory of defendant’s machines, 
which remained defendant’s property until McIntyre 
America sold them to United States customers.  It is also 
reasonable to infer that defendant dictated the “margin” or 
“commission” McIntyre America would receive when a sale 
was accomplished.  It is thus evident that the two companies 
were acting closely in concert with each other to sell 
defendant’s machines to customers throughout the United 
States, through a distribution system in which McIntyre 
America was a conduit for the sales.132 
 
Whether this alleged control will be sufficient to pierce the corporate 
veil of McIntyre UK remains unclear; it simply shows the possibility under 
jurisdictional piercing.  In the right case, piercing the corporate veil can 
bridge the gap between the two divisions of the Supreme Court on stream 
of commerce.  The plus factors listed by Justice O’Connor are not 
exhaustive.133  Exercising a level of excessive control that could amount to 
piercing the corporate veil seems to be at least as good a plus factor as 
designing or marketing the products in the forum.134 
Potentials aside, the effectiveness of jurisdictional piercing still hinges 
on the formulation of the courts.  For example, if the forum in McIntyre 
were Texas, the lack of shareholding between McIntyre UK and McIntyre 
USA could be fatal as Texas law regards shareholding as essential in 
piercing the corporate veil.135  A bird’s-eye view of the key precedents 
shows highly fragmented approaches among different states, both in their 
choice of law approaches as well as their attitudes toward adopting the test 
of liability piercing for the purpose of jurisdictional piercing.  These issues 
are further analyzed in Section IV below. 
 
 132. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 97 (N.J. Sup. 2008). 
 133. See supra note 80. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Bollore S.A. v. Import Warehouse, Inc., 448 F.3d 317, 325 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The great 
weight of Texas precedent indicates that, for the alter ego doctrine to apply against an individual under 
this test, the individual must own stock in the corporation.”). 
   
Winter 2016 PCV IN JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT  205 
 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
 
A.  PURPOSE OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
The empirical research seeks to analyze all cases decided by the courts 
in the United States for the three years beginning on January 1, 2012, and 
ending on December 31, 2014.  The purpose of the research is to survey the 
actual practices of the courts in order to observe trends and tendencies that 
could shed light on the answers to the four questions stated in the 
introduction.  In essence, it is to seek out those situations where 
jurisdictional piercing is applicable and the actual test (both choice of law 
and substantive test) adopted by the courts.  It is hoped that constructive 
proposals could be made after getting to know the full picture from this 
survey.  The full analysis will be set out in Section IV. 
 
B.  TIME PERIOD OF THE RESEARCH 
 
As stated in Section II, the jurisdictional regime has entered another 
stage of development, albeit a transitional one, since the Supreme Court 
handed down the judgments of McIntyre and Goodyear in June 2011.  This 
empirical research focused on the recent cases decided since these two 
judgments.  The time period covered starts from 2012, the first full year 
after McIntyre and Goodyear, and ends in 2014, the last full year at the 
time of writing this article. 
Whilst this time period admittedly does not account for the full history 
of development of jurisdictional piercing, it does track the contemporary 
developments of the doctrine more closely.  As indicated in Section II, 
jurisdictional piercing serves as an alternative to direct jurisdiction test 
under minimum contacts.  The development of the doctrine will therefore 
inevitably be influenced by the shaping of the mainstream minimum 
contacts doctrine.  In addition, it is also expected that the mention of 
jurisdictional piercing in Goodyear, and subsequently Daimler, would 
inspire developments on jurisdictional piercing in lower courts.  In this 
sense, the research will reflect the current practices more closely and block 
out unwanted noise from outdated information.  It is believed that the three 
full years from Goodyear and McIntyre will yield data of the highest 
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C.  IDENTIFICATION OF RELEVANT CASES 
 
The empirical research looks at three types of cases, namely, piercing 
cases, conflict cases and jurisdictional cases. 
 
1.  Piercing Cases 
 
These are cases that involve a form of piercing, including both 
liability piercing and jurisdictional piercing.  To qualify as a piercing case, 
the court has to have been asked to decide on whether to pierce the 
corporate veil in question.  The only exceptions are the rare cases where the 
courts decided on an important question related to piercing, yet were not 
asked to make a decision at that stage of the proceedings.  For example, a 
case where the court simply decides the applicable law for piercing, i.e., 
choice of law question, for later proceedings is highly relevant to this 
research and will be considered as a piercing case.136  Using the matrix of 
Table 3 in Section IV, these piercing cases cover cases in Boxes 2, 3 and 
4.137 
These piercing cases are derived from a large pool of raw cases from 
Westlaw that were found using the search phrases: “piercing the corporate 
veil” and “disregard! corporate entity.”138  These search phrases are adopted 
from Professor Robert Thompson’s seminal work on empirical research on 
piercing the corporate veil (hereinafter “Thompson Study”)139 and have 
been widely adopted in similar pieces of research, including a recent 
empirical research on the applicable law of liability piercing cases 
(hereinafter “Choice of Law Article”).140  However, it is acknowledged that 
some key jurisdictional piercing cases in the past, for example Cannon,141 
might not have used these key phrases in their judgments.  Additional 
searches on Westlaw were then conducted to identify cases that had cited 
the following key cases over the three-year period: 
 
 
 136. E.g., in a case where the court was only asked to decide the governing law of the piercing issue 
without deciding on whether the veil is to be pierced.  That issue was left for trial.  See Pac. Cycle, Inc. 
v. PowerGroup Int’l, LLC, No. 12-cv-529-wmc, 2013 WL 5745692 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“[The 
defendant] has moved for an order clarifying whether this court will apply Wisconsin or Georgia law in 
analyzing the question of alter ego liability.”). 
 137. See infra Section IV, Table 3. 
 138. See Thompson, supra note 13.  Thompson also used four undisclosed key numbers. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See King Fung Tsang, Applicable Law in Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States: A 
Choice With No Choice, 10 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 227 (2014). 
 141. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 333. 
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 Cannon142 
 Energy Reserve Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co.143 
 In re Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc.144 
 
In total, 1,587 raw cases were derived from these searches.  Each of 
these raw cases was then reviewed one by one.  To ensure the consistency 
of the review process, all cases were reviewed and processed by the author 
alone. 
 
2.  Conflict Cases 
 
Conflict cases refer to those piercing cases that have a significant 
relationship to more than one state.145  In other words, a conflict case must 
be a piercing case.  Common conflict cases include those involving an out-
of-state corporation and an out-of-state parent corporation.  These are 
generally regarded as diversity cases.  Another common type are “federal 
question” cases which means those cases that involve federal law.146  Other 
cases include, for example, contract cases involving foreign governing law, 
foreign place of performance or foreign laws and regulations.  However, 
the list is not exhaustive.  The aforementioned methodology is identical to 
the one used for the “Choice of Law Article.”147 
The conflict cases are more important for the analysis than non-
conflict piercing cases because they necessarily include the choice of law 
issue.  Conflict cases cover all cases in Boxes 3 and 4 in Table 3 in Section 
IV,148 i.e. the jurisdictional cases; and part of the Box 2 cases, i.e., those 
nonjurisdictional piercing cases with a conflict element. 
 
3.  Jurisdictional Cases 
 
These are conflict cases that involve jurisdictional piercing.  Due to 
the involvement of an out-of-state parent or subsidiary, jurisdictional cases 
 
 142. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 333. 
 143. Energy Reserve Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978). 
 144. In re Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 985 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971).  This definition is derived from 
section 2 of the Second Restatement (“Conflict of Laws is that part of the law of each state which 
determines what effect is given to the fact that the case may have a significant relationship to more than 
one state.”). 
 146. Note that while “diversity cases” and “federal question cases” used herein for the most parts 
match with the respective definitions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, they are not 
necessarily identical. 
 147. See Tsang, supra note 140, at 232–35. 
 148. See infra Section IV, Table 3. 
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are necessarily conflict cases.  These cases comprise cases in Box 3 
(jurisdictional piercing cases with no liability piercing) and Box 4 
(jurisdictional piercing cases with liability piercing) in Table 3 in Section 
IV.149  All jurisdictional cases are conflict cases as well as piercing cases.  
Needless to say, they constitute the most important cases for the empirical 
research. 
 
D.  LIMITATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
As the research was conducted based purely on decided cases, it was 
limited by selection bias, that is, “disputes selected for litigation (as 
opposed to settlement) will constitute neither a random nor a representative 
sample of the set of all disputes.”150  In addition, it must be emphasized 
again that this research only covers the three latest full years and cannot be 
regarded as giving a full account of all cases on jurisdictional piercing. To 
provide a contrast with the recent data, data on procedural piercing in the 
Thompson Study is used in this article.151 Whilst this article endeavors to 
replicate the methodology of the Thompson Study, the data contained 
therein is not individually verified by the author. 
 
IV.  THE QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS 
 
There are four important questions to ask when it comes to 
jurisdictional piercing: 
 
1.  In what situations is jurisdictional piercing generally applied? 
 a. What is the relationship between jurisdictional piercing and 
liability piercing? 
 b. What is the relationship between jurisdictional piercing, agency 
and direct jurisdiction? 
2.  How will jurisdictional piercing be applied? 
   a.  Should state law or federal law govern the jurisdictional piercing 
question?  If it were state law, which state’s law? 
   b.  Should the substantive test of jurisdictional piercing be the same 




 149. See infra Section IV, Table 3. 
 150. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 4  (1984). 
 151. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1060. 
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After setting out the background and importance of these questions, the 
answers derived from the findings from empirical research as described in 
Section III are given. 
 
Table 1 - Basic Findings, No. of cases  





















2012 340 253 63.65% 44 17.39% 
2013 348 265 76.15% 32 12.08% 
2014 355 292 82.25% 29 9.93% 
Total 1,043 810 77.66% 105 12.96% 
 
The initial search in Westlaw yielded 1,587 cases of which 1,043 were 
piercing cases.  The large number of piercing cases demonstrates the 
continued importance of piercing the corporate veil.  For example, 
compared with the Thompson Study, there were only a total of 484 cases 
between 1980 and 1985.152  The annual number of piercing cases remained 
stable, with a slight increase for each of the past two years. 
Among the piercing cases, 810 cases are conflict cases, accounting for 
77.66% of all piercing cases.  This clearly shows that it is far more 
common for a piercing case to be a conflict case than a purely domestic 
one, and thus the significance of conflict of laws consideration in piercing 
the corporate veil.  With corporations preferring to incorporate in states like 
Delaware and New York and doing business across the country, this is 
hardly surprising.  The percentage of conflict cases also continued to rise, 
increasing from 63.65% of all piercing cases in 2012 to 82.25% in 2014. 
There are 105 jurisdictional cases and these accounted for 10.67% and 
12.96% of the piercing cases and conflict cases respectively.  It is clear that 
jurisdictional piercing happened much less often than liability piercing.  
 
 152. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1048.  Yet piercing the corporate veil was already regarded as 
“the most litigated issue in corporate law.”  See id. at 1037. 
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However, with more than 100 cases relatively evenly distributed over three 
years, they still represent a substantial amount and prove that jurisdictional 
piercing is an established legal doctrine in contemporary jurisprudence.  In 
addition, comparing these with the jurisdictional piercing cases of the 
Thompson Study, it should be apparent that there has been an increase in 
jurisdictional piercing cases in the modern era.  The Thompson Study only 
has 141 jurisdictional cases up to 1985,153 just roughly four times the 
number of cases in an average year covered by this research. 
However, the significance of jurisdictional piercing cases goes beyond 
the sheer number from both a jurisdictional and liability perspective.  First, 
as discussed in Section II, if the Supreme Court formally adopts piercing 
the corporate veil as a way to establish jurisdiction and sets out the 
substantive test, jurisdictional piercing will increase exponentially and open 
up a whole new horizon for the jurisdictional regime.  Second, in regard to 
liability piercing, jurisdictional piercing successes is determinative to any 
accompanying liability piercing.  If the defendant successfully defeats 
jurisdictional piercing, the courts will have no jurisdiction and hence no 
authority to adjudicate on any liability piercing.  Thus, success in 
jurisdictional piercing essentially guarantees success in liability piercing. 
However, jurisdictional piercing cases have been on the decline over 
the past three years, from forty-four cases in 2012 to twenty-nine in 2014.  
This is a rather interesting development, especially when both the number 
of piercing cases and conflict cases increased during the same period.  One 
of the explanations could be the rejection of agency as an alternative way to 
acquire jurisdiction in Daimler.  Whilst the court was clear that it did not 
reject jurisdictional piercing, both agency and jurisdictional piercing are a 
kind of vicarious jurisdiction based on imputing the contacts of the in-
state’s subsidiary to the out-of-state parent.154  Rejecting agency, therefore, 
could have a chilling effect on jurisdictional piercing on lower courts.  That 
said, this might not be the best explanation considering that the big drop in 
jurisdictional piercing cases predated Daimler and started in 2013. 
The chilling effect of Daimler might arguably be present in the drop in 







 153. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1060. 
 154. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, at 18–19. 
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The piercing rate for the piercing cases covered in the research is 
35.28%, lower than the 40.18% in the Thompson Study.  However, while 
the relevant piercing rates of conflict cases is similar, at 36.79%, the 
piercing rate for jurisdictional piercing cases dropped significantly to just 
29.52%.  This indicates a substantially bigger challenge to piercing the 
corporate veil in jurisdictional piercing cases.  This difference in piercing 
rates between general piercing cases and jurisdictional piercing cases is 
also observed in the Thompson Study.  The jurisdictional piercing rate 
there is 36.88% compared with an overall 40.18% of all cases.155  The 
 
 155. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1060. 
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jurisdictional piercing rate of the Thompson Study is higher than the one 
here but so is the difference between the two studies in overall piercing 
rate. 
The piercing rate dropped from 46.88% in 2013 to 29.52% in 2014.  
Considering that Daimler was decided in January 2014, one could attribute 
the drop in 2014 almost entirely to Daimler.  However, the data is limited 
to just one year in 2014.  In addition, we can see that the piercing rate of 
2014 is still higher than that of 2012.  An argument, therefore, can be made 
that the 2013 high piercing rate might be just an outlier instead.  Further, 
very few cases covered in the research actually cited Goodyear or Daimler.  
Particularly with regard to Daimler and those jurisdictional piercing cases 
that have cited Daimler are generally positive on its impact on 
jurisdictional piercing,156 it will be interesting to see if the low piercing rate 
and drop in jurisdictional piercing cases continue. 
 
A.  QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JURISDICTIONAL 
PIERCING AND LIABILITY PIERCING? 
 
Normally, there will be two related companies. As mentioned earlier 
in the discussion of McIntyre, they do not necessarily need to have a 
shareholding of one another.157  These will be termed “C1” and “C2” 
hereinafter.  Since the purpose of jurisdictional piercing is to impute 
jurisdictional contacts from one entity to another, generally only one of 
them will be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum but not the other.  The 
same goes with liability and we will assume for the purpose of discussion 
that only one entity is liable or subject to the forum’s direct jurisdiction.  In 
addition, one related question is whether the jurisdictional piercing is raised 
alongside traditional liability piercing.  Jurisdictional piercing might be 
raised together with liability piercing or they might each be raised 
respectively and independent of each other.  Having regard to the above 
considerations, the exposure of C1 in terms of liability and/or jurisdiction 









 156. See supra note 9. 
 157. See Hettinger v. Kleinman, 733 F. Supp. 2d 421, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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The first thing to note from Table 3 is that jurisdictional piercing and 
liability piercing might not coincide in any given case.  Based on the 
framework in Table 3, we are interested in finding out the answers to the 
following subquestions: 
 
 How are piercing cases distributed among Boxes 2, 3 and 4? 
 How does a case falling into these boxes affect the success 
rate of piercing? 
 
Each of the four scenarios will be discussed in detail below.  Box 1 
represents the situation where neither type of piercing is required.  In that 
scenario, C1 (assuming to be the company with assets to satisfy potential 
judgment) is the only company that committed the act that is complained of 
and so liability piercing is not triggered.  There is also no need to apply 
jurisdictional piercing since C1 is subject to the direct jurisdiction of the 
court.  This direct jurisdiction can be either general or specific.  For 
example, if C1 is incorporated in New Jersey, it will be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts.  On the other hand, C2, the related 
 
 158. The purpose of the table used here and that of Brilmayer and Paisley’s article are different. 
Their table mainly discusses relationship between jurisdictional piercing and agency.  See Brilmayer & 
Paisley, supra note 20, at 9. 
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company, does not enter into the picture either on jurisdiction or liability.  
Since Box 1 does not involve either type of piercing, it is not a scenario 
that this article is concerned with and the number of such cases is not 
known. 
In Box 2, there are eighty cases, accounting for just 7.67% of all 
piercing cases.  However, the majority of these are jurisdictional piercing 
cases, representing 76.19% thereof.  Here, the plaintiff resorts to 
jurisdictional piercing against C1 but does not require liability piercing.  If 
the plaintiff were to pursue jurisdictional piercing against McIntyre UK as 
we have discussed hypothetically in Section II, it will fit into Box 2. Since 
the plaintiff only pursued McIntyre UK for products-liability directly, there 
is no need to conduct liability piercing between McIntyre UK and McIntyre 
USA.159  The plaintiff would also have no intention to make it shoulder the 
potential liability of McIntyre UK anyway since McIntyre USA had been 
made bankrupt by the time of the lawsuit.160 
In connection with jurisdiction, since we know that the Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected the stream of commerce theory, direct jurisdiction over 
McIntyre UK could not be obtained. Instead, assuming that the control 
exerted by McIntyre UK over McIntyre USA was excessive and 
legitimate,161 jurisdictional piercing could serve as a potential avenue to 
make McIntyre UK subject to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court. 
The piercing rate of Box 2 cases is 26.25%, slightly lower but still in 
line with the piercing rate of all jurisdictional cases of 29.52%. 
There are twenty-five cases in Box 3.  Box 3 requires both types of 
piercing as represented by the darkest shading in Table 3 above.  Assuming 
now that McIntyre UK was just a holding company based in England, and 
the defective machine was manufactured and sold by McIntyre USA, it will 
be necessary for the plaintiff to pursue both jurisdictional and liability 
piercing.  Technically, these are two separate exercises.  Depending on the 
respective tests under jurisdictional piercing and liability piercing, it is 
possible that piercing might be successful regarding jurisdictional piercing 
but not liability piercing.162  For example, if the court applies a more lenient 
standard for the jurisdictional piercing, the plaintiff might be successful in 
requiring the defendant to defend the lawsuit in New Jersey.  However, 
 
 159. McIntyre is a products-liability case against the manufacturer, McIntyre UK. McIntyre USA, 
the distributor, was not a defendant in the case as it had been bankrupt at the time of the proceeding.  
See Nicastro, 945 A.2d at 97 (N.J. Super. 2008) (“McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd . . . was 
defendant’s exclusive distributor in the United States prior to going bankrupt in 2001.”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 108. 
 162. Of course, if the tests for the two types of piercing are the same, one might argue for only 
needing one exercise of piercing for both purposes. 
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should the court apply a more demanding standard on liability piercing, the 
case will still fail and leave the plaintiff without any compensation.163 
Since each of the cases in Box 3 has two sets of piercing, there are two 
piercing rates.  The piercing rate of jurisdictional piercing in Box 3 is 40% 
which compares to just 26.25% in Box 2.  Thus, the observation is that the 
courts are more likely to pierce the corporate veil in a jurisdictional context 
when liability piercing is raised in the same case.  However, any strategic 
benefits gained by the plaintiff are moot since the liability piercing rate of 
Box 3 cases is 28%, not far from the 26.25% of the Box 2 jurisdictional 
piercing.  From the perspective of the defendant, as long as one of the two 
piercings is successful, it will not be liable.  This might explain the small 
number of cases involving both jurisdictional and liability piercing in Box 
3.  As we will see below, this will have an impact on our analysis of the test 
of jurisdictional piercing.164 
Finally, there are 938 cases in Box 4 with a piercing rate of 35.93%.  
Breaking it down further, there are 705 and 233 conflict cases and 
nonconflict cases respectively.  Box 4 is the opposite of Box 2.  There is no 
need for jurisdictional piercing, but a need for liability piercing.  Further, 
changing the facts of McIntyre could help illustrate this case.  It is assumed 
first that McIntyre UK and McIntyre USA were both New Jersey 
corporations and, second, that McIntyre USA was the business unit that 
manufactured the machine with McIntyre UK being a holding company.  
For the plaintiff to get any financial compensation, he will have to pierce 
the corporate veil of McIntyre USA in order to reach McIntyre UK since 
McIntyre USA is bankrupt.  On the other hand, since both corporations are 
subject to the general jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts, there will be no 
need for jurisdictional piercing.  This case did not involve jurisdictional 
piercing nor did it involve conflict of laws.  Everything happened in New 
Jersey and all parties were based in New Jersey.165 
Having regard to the above, it appears that we are most interested in 
Boxes 2 and 3, as both involve jurisdictional piercing.  However, cases 
covered in Box 4 could still be relevant even if they only involve liability 
piercing.  This is because a large percentage of jurisdictional piercing cases 
 
 163. The reverse case, that is, success in liability piercing and failure in jurisdictional piercing, is 
more difficult to comprehend.  If the plaintiff fails jurisdictional piercing in the first place, the court will 
be without jurisdiction to adjudicate the liability issue. 
 164. See infra note 173. 
 165. However, it is possible to have a conflict of law case affecting liability piercing, but does not 
involve jurisdictional piercing.  For example, if we keep McIntyre USA as an Ohio corporation, there 
will still be general jurisdiction over McIntyre UK, and hence no need for jurisdictional piercing.  But 
in terms of which law governs the liability piercing issue, there will be a choice of law issue.  The court 
may have to decide whether to apply Ohio law, the state of incorporation of McIntyre USA, or New 
Jersey law, the law of forum. 
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actually borrow their tests from liability piercing as we will see in the 
discussion of Question 3 below.166 
 
B.  QUESTION 2–WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JURISDICTIONAL 
PIERCING, AGENCY AND DIRECT JURISDICTION? 
 
As Daimler has shown,167 plaintiffs often endeavor to acquire 
jurisdiction over the out-of-state parent by both direct jurisdiction (either 
general or specific) and by other forms of vicarious jurisdiction (agency 
and/or jurisdictional piercing).  Question 2 explores the relationship 
between direct jurisdiction and jurisdictional piercing. The following sub-
questions are derived from the framework in Table 3:  
 
 Are the jurisdictional piercing claims accompanied by a direct 
jurisdiction claim under traditional minimum contacts theory 
and/or agency? 
 How does the availability of direct jurisdiction claim affect 
the piercing rate? 
 
Both Questions 1 and 2 are important because they could affect the 



















 166. One could also argue that liability piercing is per se relevant to jurisdictional piercing, since 
piercing is a concept that originated from liability piercing.  
 167. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
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Table 4 shows the extent of the impact on the piercing rate of both 
finding piercing and jurisdiction by having a direct jurisdiction discussion 
under the minimum contacts test and/or agency in the same case.  All 
jurisdictional cases are divided into the four categories in Table 4 based on 
the type of jurisdictional discussions by the court in each case.  For the 
interests of the plaintiff, it does not matter under what basis the court 
acquires jurisdiction against the defendant as long as one of the bases 
succeeds.  Accordingly, apart from showing the jurisdictional piercing rates 
under each category, the overall success rates of finding jurisdiction are 
also included.  The distribution of simple jurisdictional piercing cases and 
those with additional arguments are about even, with forty-two simple 
cases and sixty-nine cases with additional arguments. 
There are two interesting findings from Table 4.  First, one may have 
assumed that arguing for multiple bases of jurisdiction will increase the 
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chances of success in finding jurisdiction.  That is true but only to a very 
limited extent.  The additional arguments only amount to three more 
successful cases in finding jurisdiction among the three categories with 
additional arguments, namely, two and one for raising additional arguments 
of direct jurisdiction and agency/direct jurisdiction. 
Second, simple jurisdictional piercing cases with no additional 
arguments have a much higher success rate.  Compared with the ultimate 
jurisdiction success rate of the other three categories combined together, 
simple jurisdictional piercing cases have a 42.86% piercing rate, more than 
just 25.42% of the combined categories.  In addition, it is also higher than 
the general piercing rate of all jurisdictional cases (29.52%). 
The best explanation for this is probably that the courts do not need to 
analyze other grounds for jurisdiction when there is a successful and 
winning argument in jurisdictional piercing.  On the contrary, if the 
jurisdictional piercing argument is weak, both the plaintiff and the court 
will need to analyze the other bases.  Whilst these additional bases may 
help at times, they are not generally sufficient to save a weak case. In 
conclusion, more than anything, the additional bases for jurisdiction are 
just signs of weakness in the jurisdictional piercing claim.  Like raising 
liability piercing in the same case, more may not be better when it comes to 
jurisdictional piercing. 
 
C.  QUESTION 3 – SHOULD STATE LAW OR FEDERAL LAW GOVERN THE 
JURISDICTIONAL PIERCING QUESTION? IF IT WERE STATE LAW, WHICH 
STATE’S LAW? 
 
The third question is in essence a choice of law question.  Here, there 
are two levels of considerations.  First, when a state court168 is faced with a 
jurisdictional piercing question, does it have authority to decide the 
governing law?  In other words, if jurisdictional piercing, like liability 
piercing,169 is a state law matter, the states will be free to adopt their own 
governing law.  However, if jurisdictional piercing, perhaps because of its 
strong connection and significant impact on jurisdiction, is a federal law 
matter, then the state courts will have no choice but to apply federal law. 
Second, if jurisdictional piercing is a state law matter, the next level of 
consideration is which state’s jurisdictional piercing law will the state 
 
 168. For the purposes of this article, federal courts sitting in diversity cases are also regarded as 
state courts. 
 169. See Tsang, supra note 140, at 227–28. Liability piercing is largely a corporate law matter, 
though it is possible for state courts to apply federal common law, especially for liability piercing 
relating to federal statutes.  However, the application of federal common law in liability piercing is 
more a choice by the respective state courts than a federal mandate.  Id. at 257–58.  
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courts apply.  If liability piercing is any indicator, it has been found that the 
choice of law approaches of state courts vary.170  Whilst it was widely 
believed that liability piercing applies the law of the state of 
incorporation,171 a previous survey indicates that it is more of a mixed bag 
with the law of forum being a much more popular choice in practice as far 
as liability piercing is concerned.172  It will be interesting to see whether the 
choice of law approach in jurisdictional piercing resembles that of liability 
piercing. 
 
Table 5 - Choice of law between state and federal laws 
 State  Federal 
No. of cases 86 19 
Pierced cases 25 6 
Piercing rate 29.07% 31.58% 
 
The first thing to notice is the predominant number of cases applying 
state law.  This means that most courts in the United States view the choice 
of law question as one that is in the domain of the states.  There are only 
eighteen cases that applied federal law.  That indicates that only 18.10% of 
courts believe there could be only one federal test for jurisdictional 
piercing.  Thus, it is obvious that there are clear preference in adopting 
state law.  The convenience and familiarity could be a big factor, especially 
in cases where both jurisdictional and piercing issues have been raised in 
the same case.  As we have seen though, the number of these cases is not as 
sizeable as one might have thought.173 
It can also be argued that the states should make a decision as to 
which law to apply having regard to the current jurisdictional regime.  As 
discussed in Section II, the jurisdictional analysis is a two-prong analysis 
involving first the minimum contacts test under International Shoe and 
second the state long arm statute.174  In order to establish jurisdiction, 
theoretically, all courts must satisfy both prongs.175  Whilst the majority of 
states collapse these two prongs into one when they interpret the reach of 
 
 170. See Tsang, supra note 140, at 253. 
 171. See id. at 227–28. 
 172. See id. at 254. 
 173. Less than one-fourth of all jurisdictional cases.  See supra Table 3. 
 174. See Young, 315 F.3d at 261.   
 175. Id. 
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their long arm statutes to the maximum extent allowed under minimum 
contacts,176 it is a choice of the state and one cannot deny the fact that states 
are stakeholders in the exercise of jurisdiction.  As shown in Table 6 below, 
jurisdictional piercing was discussed by the courts in 21.90% of cases when 
the courts were solely considering the state’s long-arm statute and not in 
the discussion of the federal due process issue. 
 
Table 6 - Stages at which jurisdictional piercing is considered 
State long-arm statute 23 (21.90%) 
Due process: general & specific 1 (0.95%) 
Due process: general 10 (9.52%) 
Due process: specific 19 (18.10%) 
Due process: unclear 30 (28.57%) 
Unclear 22 (20.95%) 
Total 105 (100%) 
 
Second, it is perhaps more important to understand how the rule of 
jurisdictional piercing, as decided by a state, could be consistent with 
minimum contacts as Section II discusses how minimum contacts test has 
become the gold standard of jurisdictional analysis since International 
Shoe.  With minimum contacts being a federal standard based on the 
interpretation of the due process clause, it seems at first glance that it will 
not be compatible with the state jurisdictional piercing standard.  However, 
the key to reconciling the two lies in the nature of jurisdictional piercing.  
As explained by the court in Great American Duck Races, Inc. v. 
Intellectual Solutions, Inc.,177 “[t]he theory behind finding personal 
jurisdiction in such alter-ego situations is that, because the corporation and 
individual are considered to be the same entity, the jurisdictional contacts 
of one are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for purposes of the due 
process analysis.”178  In other words, instead of providing a separate and 
 
 176. See Young, 315 F.3d at 261. 
 177. Great Am. Duck Races, Inc. v. Intell. Solutions, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00436 JWS, 2013 WL 
1092990, at *1 (Ariz. D. Mar. 15, 2013). 
 178. Id. at *2. 
   
Winter 2016 PCV IN JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT  221 
competitive standard like the now faded theory of “presence,” jurisdictional 
piercing simply works to interpret who is the person/entity that is subject to 
the standard of minimum contacts.  Jurisdictional piercing, therefore, works 
with minimum contacts instead of trying to bypass it.  Accordingly, a 
number of courts have endorsed the compatibility of jurisdictional piercing 
and due process: 
 
Federal courts that have considered the issue conclude that it 
is compatible with due process for a court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over an individual . . . that would not 
ordinarily be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court 
when the individual . . . is an alter ego . . . of a corporation 
that would be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court.179 
 
A corporation is a creature of state law180 and so it makes sense for the 
states to define what it is, including when such artificial existence is to be 
disregarded.  As Brilmayer and Paisley argue, “[t]he substantive relations 
that enter into due process calculations are primarily a matter of the law 
that creates the cause of action, usually state law.  The due process clause 
does not itself create notions of agency, conspiracy, and the like.”181  
Accordingly, it can be argued that on the choice of law question, a state 
retains the authority to decide which is the test to apply for jurisdiction as 
much as for liability. 
Once it is established that the states have autonomy on the choice of 
law question, it is up to each state to find out for itself the choice of law 
rule it prefers, much like liability piercing.  To some states, that means the 
law of the state of incorporation.182  For others, it may be the law of the 
forum.183 
 
 179. Great Am. Duck Races, 2013 WL 1092990, at *2; see also Pro Tanks v. Midwest Propane & 
Refined Fuels, LLC, 988 F. Supp. 2d 772, 781 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (“This Court believes when the unique 
circumstances for a corporate veil piercing and/or alter ego determination are met the proper question is 
not whether the parent has minimum contacts with a jurisdiction.  To the contrary, the proper question 
is whether the parent and/or the subsidiary have minimum contacts, because the parent is essentially 
one in the same with the subsidiary—it is its ‘alter ego.’”) (emphasis original). 
 180. See Soviet Pan Am. Travel Effort v. Travel Comm., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 126, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“Because a corporation is a creature of state law whose primary purpose is to insulate 
shareholders from legal liability, the state of incorporation has the greater interest in determining when 
and if that insulation is to be stripped away.”). 
 181. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, at 25. 
 182. See John Guidry v. Seven Trails West, LLC, No. 4:12CV1652 FRB, 2013 WL 1883192, at *1, 
*5 (E.D. Mo. D. May 6, 2013) (“Such assertion of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant  
. . . is contingent upon the ability of the plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil.  The law of the state of 
incorporation determines whether and how to pierce the corporate veil.”).  
 183. See Estate of Thomson ex rel. Estate of Rakestraw v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 
F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008) (“In applying the alter-ego theory of personal jurisdiction in this diversity 
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Due to the fact that, essentially, most states view jurisdictional 
piercing cases as a state law matter, this makes the next choice of law 
question — which state’s law governs the jurisdictional piercing — even 
more important.  Table 7 sets out the different approaches adopted to 
decide that question: 
 



















1  1.16% 4 0.49% 




2 2.33% 41 5.06% 
Interest 
analysis 
1 1.16% 2 0.25% 




0 0% 11 1.36% 
No specified 
approaches  
60 69.77% 531 65.56% 




action, we must look to Ohio law.”). 
184.  Since nonconflict cases have no choice of law concern, they are excluded from this analysis. 
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(Table 7 continued- State’s choice of law approach) 
Consent 2 2.33% 28 3.46% 
Others 0 0 1 0.12% 
Total no. of 
conflict 
cases 
86 100% 810 100% 
 
The point that stands out most from Table 7 is not that a particular 
approach dominates the states’ choice of law approaches, but that none 
does.  The majority of cases have no choice of law analyses applied thereto 
during the adjudication process.  69.77% of jurisdictional piercing cases 
that applied state laws have not gone through choice of law analysis.  This 
is similar to the high percentage of general conflict cases (65.56%) that did 
not do the same.  It is therefore more important to look at the law actually 
applied by the courts, including the majority cases where there was no 
choice of law analyses. 
 
Table 8 - Application of forum law 
 Jurisdictional piercing 
(state law) 
Conflict cases 
Applied forum law 73 687  










Total cases 86 810 
 
It is clear from Table 8 that, like liability piercing cases, jurisdictional 
piercing cases essentially have the law of the forum applied to them at the 
end, whether there is choice of law analysis or not.  The most significant 
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differences between the two categories of cases are that jurisdictional 
piercing prefers law of the forum even more, accounting for 12.79% of 
jurisdictional piercing cases compared with just 5.56% of conflict cases; 
and has even less reliance on the law of the state of incorporation, 
accounting for only 8.14% of jurisdictional piercing cases compared with 
12.59% of conflict cases (see Table 7).  This is probably due to the much 
stronger connection and interest that the jurisdiction has with the forum.  
Unlike liability piercing, where the focus is between the parties, the 
emphasis on a relationship between a forum and the defendant seems to 
have a significant impact on the courts’ choice of law approach. 
 
D.  QUESTION 4 – SHOULD THE SUBSTANTIVE TEST OF JURISDICTIONAL 
PIERCING BE THE SAME AS THAT OF LIABILITY PIERCING? 
 
The fourth question asks what the substantive test should look like. 
Should it just be identical to the traditional corporate law tests adopted in 
liability piercing?  Or should there be a specifically designed test 
customized for the purpose of jurisdictional piercing? 
Traditionally, piercing the corporate veil is a liability concept. 
According to Professor Frederick Powell, the most common test used for 
liability piercing consists of a three-prong test: (1) excessive control, (2) 
fraud or injustice and (3) proximity to injury.185 
Although the actual tests applied by the states vary, they are, 
nonetheless, mainly a mixing and matching of the two key components: 
control and fraud.186  Generally, both components are required but there are 
also cases where they are used in a disjunctive sense.187  On the other hand, 
should jurisdictional piercing have its own test?  How relevant should 
elements of control and fraud play in this jurisdictional specific formula?  
The relationship between jurisdictional piercing and liability piercing as 
discussed in Question 1 is therefore highly relevant. 
 
 185. See FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A 
PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY (1931). 
 186. See Tsang, supra note 140, at 245. 
 187. Id. 
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Table 9 - Liability test vs. jurisdictional specific test188 
 Jurisdictional specific 
test 
Liability test 
Number of cases 37 64 
Number of pierced 
cases 
13 19 
Piercing rate 35.14% 29.69% 
 
The majority of jurisdictional cases have adopted the same liability 
test instead of creating a jurisdictional specific test.  Further, in Table 9, the 
piercing rate of liability test (29.69%) is almost identical to the general 
piercing rate of the jurisdictional piercing (29.52%).  However, the 
jurisdictional specific test has a much higher piercing rate than both the 
liability test and the general piercing test (35.28%).  The reason for this 
discrepancy seems to be the treatment of fraud element. 
It has been argued that the test for jurisdictional piercing should not be 
as demanding as liability piercing. In Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. 
Miller,189 it was said that “[u]nlike piercing the corporate veil, it is not 
necessary to show “that the shell was used to commit a fraud.”190  
Alternatively, courts have said that either establishing excessive control or 
fraud can succeed for jurisdictional piercing.  For example, in Int’l Equity 
Invs., Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners, Ltd.,191 Justice Kaplan was of the 
opinion that the control factor alone could be sufficient for jurisdictional 
piercing: 
 
New York law allows the corporate veil to be pierced either 
when there is fraud or when the corporation has been used as 
an alter ego. The latter normally requires a showing of . . . 
complete control by the dominating corporation that leads to 
a wrong against third parties.  But this standard is relaxed 
where the alter ego theory is used not to impose liability, but 
merely to establish jurisdiction.  In such an instance, the 
 
 188. There are only 101 cases in the Table.  This is because there are four cases that did not actually 
specify the test. 
 189. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 190. Id. at 904. 
 191. Int’l Equity Invs., Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners, Ltd., 475 F. Supp. 2d 456, 458 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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question is only whether the allegedly controlled entity was a 
shell for the allegedly controlling party; it is not necessary to 
show also that the shell was used to commit a fraud.192 
 
A piercing test that only needs to satisfy one factor (control) is clearly 
much easier for the plaintiff than one with two factors (control and fraud).  
This more lenient approach is reflected in those cases that have applied the 
jurisdictional specific test. 
 
Table 10 - Reason for failure in jurisdictional piercing 
 Jurisdictional 
specific  test 
 
Liability test Total 
Control, fraud 
and proximity 




1 (4.17%) 14 (31.11%) 15 (21.74%) 
 
Just fraud 2 (8.33%) 7 (15.56%) 9 (13.04%) 
 






6 (13.33%) 6 (8.70%) 
No application 3 (12.5%) 4 (8.89%) 7 (10.14%) 
 
Total 24 (100.00%) 
 
45 (100.00%) 69 (100.00%) 
 
Table 10 shows the reason why piercing failed according to the courts.  
There are sixty-nine failed piercing cases where the courts had set forth the 
jurisdictional piercing tests.  These cases are further divided between those 
that adopted a jurisdictional specific test and a liability test.  Fraud is a 
factor for 48.89%193 of cases adopting a liability test while only accounting 
for 12.5% of cases adopting a jurisdictional specific test.  Cases that failed 
entirely due to the lack of fraud account for 15.56% of liability test cases 
although only 8.33% of jurisdictional specific test cases.  In addition, even 
if same factors are to be considered for both tests, there are suggestions that 
they should be considered under a more lenient standard in a jurisdictional 
 
192.  Equity Partners, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis original). 
 193. Calculated by combining the categories of “Control, Fraud and Proximity,” “Control and 
Fraud,” and “Fraud only” in the Liability piercing column. 
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context rather than a liability context.194 
Having discussed the more lenient standard found in the jurisdictional 
specific test, the question is why there should be a different standard from 
liability piercing and how having a lower standard can be justified.  It is 
first necessary to consider the differences between the purposes of the two 
types of piercing.  The purpose of jurisdictional piercing is to make the 
parent company subject to the jurisdiction of the forum whereas the 
purpose of liability piercing is to make it subject to the debt of the 
subsidiary.  The former asks whether it is fair to require the out-of-state 
defendant to travel to the forum to defend itself195 while the latter asks 
whether it is fair for the shareholder to be responsible for the liability of the 
company.196  In other words, one examines “the relationship between the 
defendant, the forum, and the litigation,”197 and the other examines the 
relationship between the shareholder and company (the control factor)198 as 
well as the relationship between the shareholder and plaintiff (the fraud 
factor).199  This point is succinctly presented by Professor Blumberg: 
“[b]ecause the powerful influence of limited liability, creating additional 
pressures opposed to any attribution of substantive liability, is entirely 
absent in the case of amenability to jurisdiction, one might suppose that 
more relaxed standards of piercing would apply.”200 
Simply put, jurisdictional piercing aims to make the shareholder come 
to the forum; it is several steps away from making it liable for the liability 
of the company.  Under this approach, for cases where both piercings are 
alleged by the plaintiff, it remains a two-prong process: first a more lenient 
standard for jurisdictional piercing, followed by a more stringent liability 
piercing. 
By combining the two variables under Questions 3 and 4, we can 
derive four categories of potential test to be adopted for jurisdictional 
 
 194. See Miramax Film Corp. v. Abraham, No. 01-CV-5202(GBD), 2003 WL 22832384, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (“The standard for piercing the corporate veil for purposes of obtaining 
jurisdiction is a less stringent one.”). 
 195. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (Ultimately, International Shoe asks whether there 
exist minimum contacts that will satisfy “traditional notion of fair play and substantive justice.”). 
 196. See Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“In general, federal courts 
accord separate corporate entities great deference and will disregard the corporate form only in limited 
circumstances ‘when the incentive value of limited liability is outweighed by the competing value of 
basic fairness to parties dealing with the corporation.’”). 
 197. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“[T]he relationship among the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation . . . became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”). 
 198. See Gieseke ex rel. Diversified Water Diversion, Inc. v. IDCA, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 816, 830 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (“The first prong of the test focuses on the shareholder’s relationship to the 
corporation.”). 
 199. Id. at 831 (“The second prong of the test examines the relationship of the plaintiff to the 
corporation.”). 
 200. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at § 25.05[A]. 
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piercing. These are set out in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 - Possible jurisdictional tests 




60 cases with piercing 
rate of 26.67%              
1 
4 cases with piercing 





23 cases with piercing 
rate of 43.48% 
2 
14 cases with piercing 
rate of 21.43% 
4 
 
Each of the four categories will be examined in more detail below. 
 
1.  Category 1 
 
Courts adopting the approach of Category 1 essentially handle 
jurisdictional piercing the same way they do liability piercing both in terms 
of choice of law and the substantive test.  Since jurisdictional piercing 
borrows the concept from liability piercing and applies it to the 
jurisdictional context,201 it is not surprising that courts will simply apply the 
same test to both the choice of law question and the substantive test. 
First, on the choice of law question, it can be argued that the states 
should make the decision as to which law to apply having regard to the 
current jurisdictional regime. 
The argument is that if a parent company is found by the court to have 
exercised such dominance and excessive control over its subsidiary to 
defraud the plaintiff or otherwise subject him/her to injustice, there is no 
reason why that parent company should not be regarded as the same entity 
as the subsidiary for both the purposes of liability and jurisdiction.202  
Following this approach, the jurisdictional piercing and liability piercing 
 
 201. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 202. See Cardell Fin. Corp. v. Suchodolski Assocs., No. 09 Civ. 6148, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
188295, at *47–48 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012) (“On an alter-ego claim for liability, the corporate veil will 
be pierced if a plaintiff can demonstrate that ‘the alleged dominating party exercised complete 
domination over the corporation with respect to the subject transaction and that such domination was 
used to commit a fraud or other wrong which injured [the] plaintiff.’”). 
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will effectively be merged into one piercing for those cases alleging both 
piercing.  Thus, if the court accepts a plaintiff’s jurisdictional piercing 
claim, there will be no need to undergo the same piercing test for a liability 
purpose.203 
The data in Table 11 are clearly a huge vote of confidence in the 
approach of Category 1.  This is not surprising considering that liability 
cases are the mainstay of the piercing regime.  When jurisdictional piercing 
only accounts for less than one-tenth of all piercing cases, it is expected 
that courts may be influenced by the more traditional liability piercing and 
simply use the same test for both purposes.  This is also reflected by the 
lack of in-depth analysis why Category 1 is to be adopted among cases 
choosing the Category 1 approach. 
 Epps v. Stewart Information Services Corp.204 is an example of a 
Category 1 approach and is one of the most cited cases on jurisdictional 
piercing decided by the Court of Appeal of the Eighth Circuit.205  The case 
involved a class-action against a nonresident holding company based on the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and the defendant sought to dismiss 
the case due to the lack of personal jurisdiction.  In this case, the defendant 
was the only named defendant in the suit and there was no issue of liability 
piercing.206  In addition, the defendant was incorporated in Delaware, had 
no place of business in Arkansas, was not authorized to do business in 
Arkansas and had no direct contact with Arkansas other than being the 
shareholder of two Arkansas subsidiaries. 
After holding that there was no specific jurisdiction over the 
defendant, the court considered whether there could be general jurisdiction 
based on the contacts of the Arkansas subsidiaries.  Positively affirming the 
role of jurisdictional piercing, the court said that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction 
can be properly asserted over a corporation if another is acting as its alter 
ego, even if that alter ego is another corporation.”207  Secondly, on the 
choice of law question, the court stated clearly that “[s]tate law is . . . to 
determine whether and how to pierce the corporate veil.”208  The court went 
on to apply Arkansas law.209  Citing Humphries v. Bray,210 a case on 
 
 203. See, e.g., Coombs v. Unique Refinishers, Inc., No. 2:12CV102, 2013 WL 1319773, at *1 (N.D. 
Miss. Mar. 27, 2013). 
 204. Epps v. Stewart Information Services Corp., 327 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 205. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Security Fin. Corp. of Okla., Inc., 152 P.3d 165, 174 (Okla. 2006); 
Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 206. Making this a Box 2 case in Table 3.  See supra note 158. 
 207. Epps, 327 F.3d at 649. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Note that Arkansas law is both the law of forum as well as the law of incorporation of the 
subsidiaries.  See id. 
 210. Humphries v. Bray, 611 S.W.2d 791, 791 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981). 
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liability piercing, the court stated that the piercing test “is founded in equity 
and is applied when the facts warrant its application to prevent injustice.”211  
Thus, the court seems to have adopted the same piercing test as used in 
liability piercing.  Applying the test to the facts, it was found that the 
defendant was no more than an ordinary shareholder to the Arkansas 
subsidiaries.  The piercing failed accordingly, and so did personal 
jurisdiction. 
 
2.  Category 2 
 
Category 2 accords with Category 1 in terms of the choice of law 
analysis but differs regarding the substantive test.  Instead of copying the 
test of liability piercing, courts adopting the approach of Category 2 argue 
that the substantive test should be tailored for the purpose of jurisdictional 
piercing due to their differences.212 
It must be noted that Category 2 is one of the two best accepted 
approaches.  Whilst Category 1 and its liability test seem to be more 
popular, the jurisdictional specific test still accounts for more than 20% of 
all approaches.  More importantly, courts adopting Category 2, as shown in 
the discussion in Question 4 above and PHC-Minden case below, have 
clearly given more thought to explaining why it is the better approach.  On 
the other hand, courts adopting Category 1 rarely display the same effort 
and seem to have used the liability approach out of convenience.  The focus 
on control for the core element of the jurisdictional specific is hardly 
surprising and is consistent with the leading authorities discussed here. 
PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.213 is an example of a 
Category 2 approach.  Texas has been the most consistent jurisdiction in 
applying a jurisdiction specific test for jurisdictional piercing, and PHC-
Minden is one of the best representative cases on this position by the Texas 
Supreme Court.214 
PHC-Minden is a products liability case.  The manufacturer filed a 
third party claim against a hospital in Louisiana.  The issue was whether 
Texas could assume jurisdiction over the hospital.  Whilst the hospital was 
not a Texas resident, the manufacturer argued that its parent, a Tennessee 
corporation, did business in Texas and the parent’s contacts should be 
 
 211. Humphries, 611 S.W.2d at 793. 
 212. See Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Haygood, 402 S.W.3d 766, 779 (Tex. 2013) 
(“We note that ‘jurisdictional veil-piercing’ is distinct from ‘substantive veil-piercing,’ so imputing a 
related entity’s contacts for jurisdictional purposes requires a showing that the parent controls the 
subsidiary’s internal operations and affairs.”). 
 213. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2007). 
 214. See also BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002). 
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imputed to the hospital, thereby subjecting the hospital to Texas’s 
jurisdiction. 
On the question of jurisdictional piercing, the court began by 
approving jurisdictional piercing as a means of acquiring jurisdiction, 
holding that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction may exist over a nonresident defendant 
if the relationship between the foreign corporation and its parent 
corporation that does business in Texas is one that would allow the court to 
impute the parent corporation’s ‘doing business’ to the subsidiary.”215  
While the court did not expressly address the choice of law issue, it is clear 
from the judgment that the court adopted state law.  For example, the court 
stated that “the party seeking to ascribe one corporation’s actions to another 
by disregarding their distinct corporate entities prove this allegation 
because Texas law presumes that two separate corporations are distinct 
entities.”216  It then clarified that Texas’s test is jurisdictional specific, 
stating that “veil-piercing for purposes of liability (“substantive veil-
piercing”) is distinct from imputing one entity’s contacts to another for 
jurisdictional purposes (“jurisdictional veil-piercing”).”217  This distinction 
is mainly caused by the fact that jurisdictional piercing involves 
consideration of due process.218  Regarding the components of the test, 
most notably, “fraud — which is vital to [liability] piercing . . . —  has no 
place in assessing contacts to determine jurisdiction.”219  Instead, “atypical 
control” is the only prerequisite for the piercing test.220  In addition, the 
court added that certain factors that are relevant to liability piercing had no 
relevance to jurisdictional piercing, such as sharing of names and 
undercapitalization.221  Applying the above test to the facts, it was found 
that there was no atypical control exerted by the parent over the hospital 
and the case was accordingly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
 
3.  Category 3 
 
Category 3 is the category that takes away the states’ authority in 
terms of choice of law and applies a uniform substantive test that resembles 
the one used in the liability context.  There are only four Category 3 cases, 
the least among the four categories.  The reason for the lack of support for 
 
 215. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 173. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 174. 
 218. Id. (“This makes sense in light of the fact that personal jurisdiction involves due process 
considerations that may not be overridden by statutes or the common law.”). 
 219. Id. at 175. 
 220. See id. at 176. 
 221. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 174. 
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this approach may lie in the odd Cannon case. 
Whilst uncertainties revolve around the true meaning of Cannon, one 
way of interpreting it could fit it into this category.  First, as mentioned in 
Section II, Cannon was decided before both International Shoe and Erie. 
Thus, the principle that it laid down on jurisdictional piercing could be 
interpreted as federal common law.222  While Cannon could be theoretically 
overruled by both Erie and International Shoe,223 the case remains valid in 
view of Supreme Court’s decision in Keeton.224  Apart from that, there has 
been a long line of lower cases applying Cannon to jurisdictional 
piercing.225  Thus, it can be argued that Cannon has mandated a federal 
standard for jurisdictional piercing despite the lack of Supreme Court 
authority on how Cannon can be reconciled with International Shoe. 
Whilst Justice Brandeis avoided using the term liability piercing in 
Cannon,226 the most decisive factor cited by the court in Cannon appears to 
be corporate formality.  This is different from the classic three-prong 
approach but does fit with another line of classic piercing cases.227  
Although this formalistic approach and the control-focused approach of 
Category 2 do not require the fraud prong, Cannon’s emphasis could be 
much more stringent than the test of Category 2.  For large corporations, it 
is much easier for them to maintain corporate formalities, thus rendering it 
difficult to pierce the corporate veil under the more flexible and equitable 
based approach.228 
However, as Table 11 has shown, much to the expectation of 
Professor Blumberg,229 Cannon has become a non-factor in the area of 
jurisdictional piercing.  In fact, there are only thirty-five cases that have 
cited Cannon in the three-year research period according to Westlaw, and 
most of them simply cited Cannon’s basic premise of maintaining the 
independent separateness of companies in jurisdiction without relying on 
 
 222. See supra note 22. 
 223. See John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdiction Over 
Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV. 445, 456 (2004). 
 224. See supra note 22. 
 225. See Swain & Aguilar, supra note 223, at 450 (“Over 500 published cases have cited Cannon 
since 1925.”). 
 226. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 227. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 24–28 (“The criteria for the Cannon doctrine will be 
immediately recognized as very much the same as one of the alternative criteria for establishing the first 
prong of classic piercing jurisprudence, turning on the subsidiary’s lack of separate existence.”). 
 228. See Voxman, supra note 20, at 330 n.9 (“Some commentators argue that Cannon is too 
formalistic in the sense that the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship will almost always 
result in the recognition of the corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional 
purposes.”). 
 229. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 24–26 (“With passage of time, the authority of 
Cannon has been significantly eroded.”). 
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Cannon for the actual jurisdictional test.  As much as the formalistic 
approach becomes a thing in the past in liability piercing, the same seems 
to be the case for jurisdictional piercing. 
 
4.  Category 4 
 
Category 4 is the exact opposite to Category 1. It can be seen as a 
further transformation of Cannon.  As Cannon has not made it very clear 
what substantive test to apply, some courts therefore have decided to adopt 
a jurisdictional specific test instead.  Thus, it may be regarded as a mix of 
Categories 2 and 3.  In terms of piercing rate, the contrast with Category 2 
is great.  Category 2 has the highest piercing rate while Category 4 has the 
lowest.  This again reflects the huge distinction in piercing rates between 
the jurisdictional specific test and liability test as it has been extensively 
discussed in Question 4 above. 
None of the cases adopting this category in the empirical research 
explained clearly why this is the proper approach.  Searching through older 
authorities, the leading case that explained this approach was Energy 
Reserve.230  In that case, the Kansas District Court took a very innovative 
view of choice of law.  According to the court, the minimum contacts test 
is the one and only avenue in establishing jurisdiction since International 
Shoe.231  Technically speaking, the court was of the opinion that piercing 
the corporate veil does not play “any proper role in the analysis of the 
constitutional propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction.”232  This is because 
“[t]he formalistic approach of the alter ego doctrine . . . is irrelevant to the 
question [of] whether the exercise of jurisdiction over an absent parent 
corporation would violate the Due Process Clause.”233  In other words, 
there can only be one federal standard based on minimum contacts.  Based 
on this approach, the “piercing” test is necessarily jurisdictional specific.  
The two-prong test of control and fraud that Category 1 used for both 
liability and jurisdictional purposes will be merged with the standard 
minimum contacts test.  From the court’s perspective, components of 
liability piercing are relevant but not necessary for the finding of 
jurisdiction: 
 
Concededly, a corporation’s relationship with an affiliated 
corporation in the forum is relevant to the due process 
 
 230. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978). 
 231. Id. at 496 (“All exercise of state court jurisdiction, and impliedly the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in federal court . . . must be analyzed under the standards of International Shoe.”). 
 232. Id. at 490. 
 233. In re Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 909, 915 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
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question in a manner different from that in which it pertains 
to the corporate law question of alter ego relationships and 
“veil piercing.”  For alter ego purposes the nature of the 
relationship the identity between the corporations is alone 
controlling.  For jurisdictional purposes, the fact of the 
existence of the relationship however substantial or 
attenuated the relationship may be is a minimum “contact, 
tie or relation” with the forum that may render possible the 
constitutional exercise of jurisdiction if the relevant factors, 
including both convenience and the orderly administration of 
the laws, balance in that direction.  The mere existence of the 
relationship is one relevant factor.  The nature of the 
relationship the degree of control or identity bears upon the 
weight to be given that one factor, but it does not foreclose 
reliance on this factor as a legitimate consideration in the 
due process analysis.  The distinction between the two 
standards should be readily apparent.234 
 
Accordingly, gone are the rigid requirements of passing control and 
fraud prongs.  Instead, control and fraud are all but two factors on the long 
list of facts considered by the court to see whether the case warrants the 
finding of minimum contacts. 
Both Categories 2 and 4 advocate a jurisdictional specific test.  
However, the test of Category 2 appears to be about customizing the 
traditional piercing test whilst Category 4, as explained by Energy Reserve, 
could be viewed as rejecting the pigeonhole approach and merging the 
jurisdictional test with minimum contacts.  Besides, technically Category 2 
still tries to interpret the identity of the “person” who is subject to the 
minimum contacts test.  On the other hand, Category 4 under Energy 
Reserve does not interpret the identity of the “person” but what constitutes 
a “contact.” 
However, even by looking at the cases in Category 4, it seems that the 
Energy Reserve approach above is devoid of practical significance.  No 
case during the three-year research period relied on the Energy Reserve 
approach.  Even for raw cases, there are only four cases that have cited 
Energy Reserve and In re Teletronics during the three-year research period. 
Despite the well-reasoned argument of Energy Reserve, the lack of support 
probably stems from a lack of higher courts’ endorsement both at the State 
Supreme Court or Federal Court of Appeals level.235  It is also too far from 
 
 234. Energy Reserve, 460 F. Supp. at 507. 
 235. In Hart Holding Co. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., the Court of Chancery of Delaware 
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the more established practices of Categories 1 and 2 which makes it a 
“dangerous innovation”236 for the courts.  Finally, as will be shown in 
Amrep below, the same result desired by the judge could be easily achieved 
by Categories 1 and 2, particularly Category 2.  Thus, there is no need for 
the courts to overhaul their entire regime. 
Alto Eldorado Partnership v. Amrep237 is an example of a Category 4 
approach and is a case decided by the Court of Appeal of New Mexico.  
Despite the lack of support of the Energy Reserve approach based on data 
derived from the empirical review, Amrep is still a worthwhile case to 
examine for the purpose of this article as the three judges in the case each 
vowed for Categories 1, 2 and 4 respectively. 
The case revolved around whether the New Mexico court had 
jurisdiction over Amrep, an out-of-state parent company listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange.  The key issue was whether jurisdiction could be 
based on Amrep’s relationship with its New Mexico subsidiary. 
The first judge, Judge Kennedy, adopted the Category 4 approach.238 
Following the lead of Energy Reserve, Judge Kennedy did not require “all 
of the elements of alter ego be proven in order to hale a foreign corporate 
parent into court, but [he] can and will consider whatever elements a 
plaintiff shows in assessing minimum contacts.”239  More particularly on 
control, he was of the view that “[t]he corporate relationship might also be 
probative of whether it is fundamentally fair to require the defendant to 
defend a suit in the forum.”240  This is the same for the fraud factor.241  
Finding that Amrep exerted excessive control over the subsidiary in New 
Mexico, including its day-to-day operations, Judge Kennedy found the 
necessary minimum contacts to claim jurisdiction. 
The second judge, Judge Sutin, concurred with the finding of 
jurisdiction but not the reasoning of Judge Kennedy.  His approach was 
exactly the same as Category 2.  He started with the traditional three-prong 
liability piercing test adopted by New Mexico.  After reviewing certain 
precedents, he found that “[a] prima facie showing of instrumentality or 
 
rejected Energy Reserves as a case rarely followed.  See No. 11514, 1992 WL 127567, at *718 (Del. 
Ch. May 28, 1992) (“It has not met with wide or easy acceptance elsewhere.  It certainly does not 
represent the law of Delaware.”). 
 236. See Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
 237. Alto Eldorado Partnership v. Amrep, 124 P.3d 585 (N.M. 2005).  
 238. Id. at 595 (“[T]his principle in holding that due process guided by elements of an alter ego 
analysis frame our inquiry into the district court's personal jurisdiction over Amrep.  The question then 
is not whether corporate law restricts our jurisdiction in contravention of the above principle, but 
whether due process allows for it.”). 
 239. Id. at 594. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. (“[T]he showing of formation for an improper purpose . . . while not constitutionally 
mandated, might also be probative.”). 
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domination should be sufficient to establish the minimum contacts 
necessary for jurisdiction without also having to prove the improper or 
fraudulent purpose and proximate causation elements required to establish 
liability.”242  Thus, his approach is the same as PHC-Minden, requiring just 
the first control prong for jurisdictional piercing.  Finding the plaintiff had 
presented sufficient evidence for the first prong, he dismissed Amrep’s 
motion for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Finally, the third judge, Judge Packard, delivered the dissenting 
opinion.  He adopted the classic Category 1 test.  Going through a long list 
of authorities, he criticized the other judges’ approach as not being 
supported by precedents.  Instead, he believed that the traditional three-
prong liability test was proper.243  To justify his approach, he reasoned that 
“corporations are formed precisely for the purpose of insulating the owners 
thereof and such purpose ought to be respected, whether for liability or 
jurisdiction.”244 
 
Table 12 - Underlying claim of jurisdictional piercing 
 Contract 
 
Tort Statute Unclear Total 
 Number of 
cases 




40.95% 30.48% 26.67% 1.90% 100% 
 Pierced cases 13 8 9 1 31 
 Piercing rate  31.71% 25% 32.14% 50% 29.52% 
 
Finally, we look at whether the jurisdictional piercing rate is 
influenced by the underlying claim.  Under prevailing corporate theory, it is 
believed that courts should be more willing to piece corporate veil in tort 
cases than contract cases due to the fact that plaintiffs in contracting cases 
will have the opportunity to protect themselves by choosing the more 
 
 242. Alto Eldorado, 124 P.3d at 599. 
 243. Id. at 600 (“Other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have unequivocally held that for 
purposes of personal jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to establish only instrumentality, and instead a 
plaintiff must also establish that the corporation that is using another corporation as its instrumentality 
has formed it or is using it to perpetrate a fraud or other injustice or for some other improper purpose.”). 
 244. Id. 
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solvent counterparty.245  This theory was found to be incompatible with the 
data from the Thompson Study.246  For jurisdictional piercing, one might 
argue that the court should be more willing to grant a plaintiff’s request to 
pierce jurisdictionally in tort cases considering that plaintiffs in contract 
cases can choose to contract directly with the out-of-state parent in order to 
get the forum court to have specific jurisdiction thereto.  However, the data 
shows the same puzzling picture as in the Thompson Study.  It is found that 
contract cases actually have a higher piercing rate (40.95%) than that of tort 
cases (30.48%).  This finding, however, is not conclusive due to the lack of 
tort cases in the samples here. 
 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
In connection with the current jurisdictional piercing practice, it is 
clear that the contemporary approach is to leave the decision on choice of 
law to each state while not supporting a federal standard across the nation.  
Of course, simply having a majority of courts adopting the former approach 
does not necessarily mean that it is the better approach.  However, without 
any clear precedent from the Supreme Court, each state reaches this 
approach organically instead of having a standard imposed on them from 
the top.  This fact suggests at least the advantage of assumed efficiency. 
The analysis, however, should not stop there.  The state choice of law 
approach shall be subject to an important caveat, that is, jurisdictional 
piercing must not be of such a low standard that renders the minimum 
contacts test meaningless.  The constitutional structure of jurisdictional 
piercing under the state choice of law approach is to interpret what a 
“person” means in the minimum contacts test.  If the definition of “person” 
is entirely up to the state to interpret without any limitation, it is 
theoretically for the state to adopt an unreasonably low standard for 
jurisdictional piercing, such as the ownership of shares.  This point has 
been raised by Brilmayer and Paisley succinctly, stating that: 
 
the state may not alter the definition of state-created rights in 
order to defeat a federal constitutional claim.  Similarly, states 
may not alter their procedural rules when federal rights are at 
stake. Discriminatory treatment of federal rights is unconstit-
utional, and the Supreme Court will review a state law decision 
 
 245. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1038. 
 246. See id. at 1058 (finding that “the results show that courts pierce more often in the contract 
context than in tort context”). 
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to determine whether it has a substantial basis in state law.247 
 
A standard like that will essentially catch all passive out-of-state 
holding companies which do nothing in the forum state other than holding 
shares in a subsidiary that is subject to forum jurisdiction, and effectively 
rendering minimum contact meaningless.  In other words, this definition 
will create minimum contacts for simple shareholding and violate the basic 
minimum contact test. 
By analogy, Daimler has shown that the Supreme Court will not 
hesitate to clamp down on vicarious jurisdiction if the state test becomes so 
lenient that it would render the minimum contacts standard meaningless.  
As we have seen in that case, the Ninth Circuit’s version of the agency test 
simply asks whether the agent is important to the parent.248  Justice 
Ginsburg is of the view that such a low standard will have the effect of 
subjecting every single multinational company to the jurisdiction of every 
state where it does business with an agent.249  In essence, this is a floodgate 
argument.  While there is no reported jurisdictional piercing during the 
research period that adopts a low standard as simple share ownership, this 
is certainly an important threshold to bear in mind. 
On the question of the substantive test, the issue of whether courts 
should adopt a jurisdictional specific test seems to hinge on whether 
jurisdictional piercing should be more lenient than liability piercing given 
the much higher piercing rate yielded under the jurisdictional specific test.  
The answer seems to be positive given that jurisdictional piercing simply 
requires the defendant to defend himself in the forum instead of having the 
liability conclusively imposed thereon.  It also makes sense to restrict the 
application of the fraud factor to liability piercing instead of jurisdictional 
piercing.  It is still hard to see why fraud has to be an essential element for 
jurisdictional piercing.  Piercing the corporate veil, even for liability 
purposes, is influenced by the underlying cause of action.250  The prime 
examples of a more lenient standard in a liability context are those cases 
involving ERISA.  In ERISA cases, courts almost always refer to the 
federal policy behind ERISA to protect employees and thus always forgo 
 
 247. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, at 27. 
 248. See supra note 112. It is noted that in discussing the Ninth Circuit’s test on agency, the 
Supreme Court did not reject the test on the basis of it not being a uniform federal standard but simply 
object to the broad test.  This could be seen as a support to the conclusion of the author’s view on 
Question 1, that is, to adopt states’ rules on jurisdictional piercing. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Brennan v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 12-cv-10551, 2012 WL 3888218, at *3 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 7, 2012) (“It is well established that piercing the corporate veil is not itself a cause of 
action.”). 
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the fraud element as an essential factor.251  For jurisdictional piercing, it can 
be argued that underlying federal justification for the assertion of 
jurisdiction is purposeful availment.  This certainly is a much lower 
standard than fraud.  If a parent company exerts excessive control over the 
subsidiary to the extent that it becomes merely an instrument of the 
corporation for the purpose of doing business in the forum, it could be 
considered as purposefully making available the benefits and protection of 
the forum.  Fraud, on the other hand, will impose the higher standard that 
the underlying federal policy demands.  Unlike liability piercing where 
piercing is supposed to happen only when the privilege of incorporation is 
“abused,” jurisdiction does not operate in the same way.  As long as an out-
of-state corporation has obtained the protection and benefits of the forum, 
the quid pro quo is to be subject to the forum’s jurisdiction.  Therefore, the 
fraud factor, apparently a factor installed to cater for the concept of “abuse” 
can have no place in the jurisdictional piercing formula.  The emphasis on 
control factor can also be found in the rare federal court judgments that 
have discussed jurisdictional piercing after Daimler.252 
It is noted that adopting a more lenient, jurisdictional specific standard 
will have the effect of expanding the jurisdiction of the United States.  
While the normative aspect of the expansion of the jurisdiction is a much 
larger topic that this article intends to cover, such expansion, at least as far 
as a jurisdictional specific standard will bring thereto, is justified.  First, it 
must be noted that unlike changing the minimum contacts standard, 
jurisdictional piercing remains an exception that will be applied by courts 
with caution.  The eventual expansion of jurisdiction, therefore, as a result 
of the adjustment brought by the jurisdictional specific test will be limited. 
In addition, as we have seen in Section IV, a jurisdictional specific test only 
has a 5.45% higher piercing rate than the liability test.  Thus, it is expected 
that the adjustment will only help such marginal cases, but it will not help 
in overhauling the entire jurisdictional regime. 
Normatively, although the Supreme Court has shown concern on the 
effect that expanding the United States’ jurisdiction will have on comity, 
the modest expansion suggested here should be acceptable.  In McIntyre, it 
is clear that the three Justices led by Justice Ginsburg are ready to extend 
the jurisdiction of New Jersey to cover McIntyre UK.  Drawing on the 
equivalent European Union jurisdiction rules, Justice Ginsburg thought it 
 
 251. See NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553 (3d Cir. 1983) (In claims pursuant to the 
National Labor Relations Act, the standard for establishing the existence of an alter ego is less 
burdensome: “[t]he focus of the alter ego doctrine . . . is on the existence of a disguised continuance or 
an attempt to avoid the obligations of a collective bargaining agreement through a sham transaction or a 
technical change in operations.”). 
 252. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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was absurd for New Jersey to have no jurisdiction as the place of injury 
when the home court of McIntyre UK would have allowed such jurisdiction 
should the injury happen in the European Union.253  This is just one 
example in which current United States jurisdiction is actually not as 
expansive as it is perceived.  This view is also supported by Professor 
Trevor Hartley, a leading scholar on EU law and private international 
law.254 
Ultimately, adopting the jurisdictional specific test reaffirms the 
overall goal of jurisdictional piercing; that is, to bring the jurisdictional test 
closer to the actual world.  As stated by Justice Weinstein in Bulova Watch 
Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., “we cannot apply the law in a way that 
has any hope of making sense unless we attempt to visualize the actual 
world with which it interacts.”255  Jurisdictional piercing is valuable 
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